Equity versus Equality by Konow, James et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Equity versus Equality
James Konow and Tatsuyoshi Saijo and Kenju Akai
Kiel University, Loyola Marymount University, Kochi Institute of
Technology, University of Tokyo
1 December 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/75376/
MPRA Paper No. 75376, posted 5 December 2016 10:16 UTC
         December 2016 
 
Equity versus Equality 
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Abstract 
How should economic output be distributed among those who created it? An expansive 
theoretical and empirical literature seeks to answer this fundamental, and controversial, question, 
which has implications, inter alia, for the structure of wages, redistributive policies and 
international agreements. Among the possible fairness rules that have been proposed, the primary 
rivals are equality and equity, whereby the latter refers to allocating in proportion to some 
measure of individual contributions. This paper reports the results of an experiment conducted in 
the United States and Japan. It investigates a large variety of factors that might affect preferences 
for equity and equality, including multiple approaches to examining concepts of culture. We find 
impersonal third parties, or spectators, exclusively favour equity. Distributive preferences move 
incrementally toward equality, however, when subjects share personal stakes (i.e., are 
stakeholders), and even further toward equality, when stakeholder anonymity is lifted. Although 
the degree of self-interest sometimes differs across countries, these findings about fairness 
preferences are robust with respect to a wide range of non-ethics variables that seldom matter, 
including race, income, gender, nationality and culture. We interpret the findings as suggesting 
that equity is an impersonal (or impartial) rule of fairness, whereas fairness preferences move 
progressively toward equality with greater proximity, i.e., as relationships become more personal 
through belonging to a group and being non-anonymous. 
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How should economic output be distributed among those who have contributed to its creation? 
There is scarcely a question in economics more fundamental, or controversial, than this one. The 
answer has wide-ranging implications for the structure of wages at the firm- and industry-level, 
for returns to human and property resources, and for the redistribution of income and wealth, 
both within countries through their domestic policies as well as between countries through 
treaties and trade agreements. The textbook version of neoclassical economics, with its emphasis 
on marginal productivity theory and efficiency, seems consistent with (a version of) equity. In 
the social science literature on justice, the term “equity” commonly refers to rewarding 
individuals in proportion to some measure of their contributions. On the other hand, people often 
profess a desire for equality, a common interpretation of which is strict egalitarianism, i.e., equal 
allocations irrespective of contributions. Along these lines, many economists as well as many 
members of the general public have expressed growing concern in recent years about rising 
economic inequality, as evidenced, for example, by the considerable academic and popular 
interest in contributions to the topic by Piketty (2014) and Stiglitz (2012). Of course, opposition 
to current levels of inequality does not by itself allow one to ascertain whether the favoured 
target is equality or merely less inequality (perhaps still in keeping with equity). It does, 
however, underscore the great importance of distributive preferences and the value of clarifying 
the rules governing those preferences. 
This study examines preferences for equity and equality and the factors that affect such 
preferences using variations of a dictator experiment. In our version, subjects in the United States 
(US) and Japan first perform a task that generates earnings, and then arbitrarily selected 
“dictators” allocate the earnings to recipients, who have no recourse. The subject matter of this 
study belongs to distributive justice, here understood to concern the distribution of income and 
wealth. Within the empirical and theoretical justice literature, equity and equality are the most 
prominent rivals for fairness principles, but no consensus has yet emerged about whether or 
when each applies. To our knowledge, this paper reports the most comprehensive study of 
factors that might affect equity and equality preferences: we consider, inter alia, entitlement, 
culture, nationality, size of stakes, income, race, gender, and group vs. individual decisions. We 
employ a laboratory experiment, specifically a non-strategic design, because it allows us to 
control forces that might otherwise confound inferences from observational data, such as 
strategic self-interest and a concern for reputation. The design targets both impartial and partial 
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distributive preferences and analyses possible cultural effects based both on a self-report 
instrument and on behaviour in a novel treatment designed to induce cultural variation. 
Recent theoretical and empirical research underscores the economic, political and social 
importance of fairness preferences, in particular, as those preferences relate to what constitutes 
fair and unfair inequality. For example, there is evidence that people accept inequalities due to 
factors people control (e.g., effort) but reject inequalities resulting from factors people do not 
control (e.g., luck), including from questionnaire studies like Faravelli (2007) as well as from 
experiments like Konow (2000). An implication is that people are more supportive of 
redistribution, the greater the role of luck in producing economic outcomes. Of course, the 
relative importance of effort and luck is sometimes open to interpretation. Alesina and Angeletos 
(2005), for example, demonstrate how different beliefs across countries about the source of 
income differences can affect national tax policies, and Alesina et al. (2012) show how different 
beliefs can impact the economic growth of countries. In related work, Ooghe and Peichl (2015) 
analyse the design of optimal tax-benefit schemes, when earnings result from a combination of 
controlled and uncontrolled factors but the exact role of each cannot be perfectly observed. 
The relevance of fairness extends beyond national redistributive policies. For example, 
Holm and Danielson (2005) find that the strength of distributive preferences as revealed in 
dictator experiments is predictive of trustworthiness (i.e., the willingness to reciprocate other’s 
generosity) across such dissimilar countries as Sweden and Tanzania. Several experimental 
studies have demonstrated the importance for the optimal provision of public goods of precisely 
the three forces we focus on here: equality, equity and self-interest. In the study of Balafoutas, 
Kocher, Putterman and Sutter (2013), subjects trade off self-interest and fairness, whereby their 
choices of allocation schemes for group earnings reflect a greater acceptance of equalizing, when 
initial inequalities are arbitrary than when they are earned through task performance, echoing the 
luck vs. effort distinction cited above. Reuben and Riedl (2013) find equity and equality to be the 
two most salient rules for establishing cooperation, but high contributions to the public good are 
only sustained, when punishment is possible. Subjects in Noussair and Tan (2011) may choose 
whether to adopt a punishment regime, which as in Reuben and Riedl turns out to be conducive 
to cooperation, but often fail to choose the optimal regime. The authors give as a possible reason 
for this failure ambiguity about norms of equity or equality, which underscores the importance of 
the current project of identifying the factors that affect the weight assigned to each of these two 
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rules. Of course, the degree of inequality ultimately chosen by private or public policy-makers 
also has implications for efficiency. For example, Burdín (2015) shows how the degree of wage 
inequality chosen by firms has important implications for their ability to retain high-ability 
workers. 
The results of our experiment are striking in terms of what does and does not matter for 
fairness preferences. In the literature, the relative preference for equity vs. equality is sometimes 
associated with the cultural distinction between collectivism vs. individualism (e.g., Kashima et 
al., 1988), nationality (e.g., Cappelen, Moene, Sørensen and Tungodden, 2013), and 
demographic variables such as race or gender (e.g., Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Most 
experimental evidence is based on the choices of stakeholders, or individuals with stakes in the 
decisions they are making. We find in our study, however, that spectators, or impartial third 
parties allocating rewards to others, display an exclusive preference for equity that is remarkably 
consistent across cultural, national and demographic boundaries. Such spectator preferences are 
potentially useful for various reasons. For example, Konow (2009) argues their relevance for 
evaluating and informing normative theories and economic policies, and Schram and Charness 
(2015) employ them as a source of advice aimed at influencing stakeholder behaviour. Here they 
also serve as a basis for comparison with stakeholder preferences. Relative to spectators, we find 
that stakeholders who share earnings anonymously shift significantly toward equalising earnings, 
and stakeholders shift further toward equality, when their decisions are non-anonymous. Indeed, 
non-anonymous stakeholders equalise completely, as the stakes approach zero. Ultimately, we 
conclude these results are most consistent with an impersonal (or impartial) preference for equity 
combined with a personal preference for equality that varies in strength monotonically with 
proximity (i.e., how personal the relationship is between individuals) and stakes.1 
A separate question concerns the strength of material self-interest relative to fairness 
preferences, whatever rules govern fairness preferences. In this study, average allocations to 
recipients do not, in many cases, differ significantly from those recipients’ contributions to 
earnings based on their average task performance. This is consistent with List’s (2007) finding 
that tasks, in comparison to windfall earnings, seemingly solidify property rights and reduce the 
                                                 
1 Bohnet and Frey (1999a, 1999b) also find reduced self-interest, when subjects communicate and are 
non-anonymous, although they do not specifically study equity versus equality. Corgnet (2012) is closer 
in this regard, and his results are consistent with ours, despite numerous differences between our study 
and his in focus, subject matter (viz., peer evaluations and team performance) and design. 
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role of self-interest. Nevertheless, under certain conditions, stakeholders do take significantly 
more than they contribute, on average, and, in this respect, national or demographic differences 
sometimes emerge. For instance, individual anonymous stakeholders, who are big spenders 
outside the laboratory, take, on average, more than they contribute in both the US and Japan. In 
addition, anonymous stakeholders take, on average, more than they contribute, both in individual 
and in group dictator decisions, but only in the US, which mirrors the greater self-interest 
exhibited by US subjects in some other comparisons, e.g., see Rey-Biel, Sheremeta and Uler 
(2016). This study also contributes to research on groups (or teams) and finds that groups are 
more selfish than individuals, contrary to Cason and Mui (1997) but consistent with Luhan, 
Kocher and Sutter (2009), although we additionally find more selfish groups to be associated 
with more selfish individuals in the US and more equitable ones in Japan. Other variables seldom 
matter, including age, income, work hours, race, gender, culture and nationality. 
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. Section 1 discusses factors that have 
been related to fairness preferences in the literature. Section 2 presents the experimental design 
and states hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 reports and analyses the results, and section 4 
contains the discussion and conclusions. 
1. Factors Related to Fairness Preferences 
The design of the present experiment is informed by a rich but disperse literature related 
to fairness preferences. The focus of this study, which has been scarcely examined thus far, is on 
factors that potentially affect the equity-equality trade-off, that is, whether fairness preferences 
correspond to equity, equality or some combination of the two. To be clear, equality refers in this 
paper not to equal opportunities, equal rights or equal ratios, but rather to equal outcomes, i.e., 
strict egalitarianism. Equity, by contrast, refers here to rewards that are proportional to 
contributions to joint earnings. The discussion of this literature is broken down into four parts, 
which correspond to the top four (of the five) categories of variables that Camerer (2003) 
identifies as being important in social preference experiments. We order variables according to 
Camerer’s taxonomy, although, several might arguably be categorised differently in the context 
of our experiment, as explained below. 
1.1 Structural Variables 
We begin with the category Camerer considers “the most useful to study,” viz., structural 
 5 
variables, “because they connect simple games to richer economic structures … and also provide 
the most direct clues to the psychology underlying social preference” (pg. 75). The structural 
variable that is central to the concept of equity is entitlement, or a sense of property rights, which 
in the laboratory is typically conveyed through subject participation in a task. Some experiments 
find proportionality of fair rewards to task performance, consistent with equity, e.g., Gächter and 
Riedl (2006), whereas others suggest a mix of equity and equality preferences, e.g., Cappelen, 
Hole, Sørensen and Tungodden (2007). These findings highlight a challenge to this research: 
whereas equity seems to be chosen simply because of a preference for it, one can think of various 
other explanations for why people might steer toward equality. For one, equality can occur as a 
special case of a more general principle that otherwise generates inequality. For instance, the 
accountability principle of justice (Konow, 2000) claims fair rewards are in proportion to the 
contributions people control, but if contributions under individual control do not differ or differ 
solely because of factors people cannot control, fair allocations reduce to equal shares. Another 
common reason for equality is the ceteris paribus assumption: when information about relevant 
differences is either unavailable or unreliable, people usually assume away any such differences 
and favour equality by default (see Konow, 2003). 
1.2 Culture and Nationality 
Economics experiments of possible cultural differences in social preferences have come 
to differing conclusions. The seminal paper of Roth et al. (1991) finds ultimatum game offers are 
higher in the US and Slovenia than in Japan and Israel, whereas Okada and Riedl (1999) 
discover no such differences between Austrian and Japanese subjects.2 Buchan and Croson 
(2004) report differences in trust between US and Chinese subjects, whereas Brandts, Saijo and 
Schram (2004) find no significant differences in cooperation between subjects in the US, Japan, 
the Netherlands and Spain. Such studies raise questions not only about the type of social 
preferences potentially at work but also their strength. Cason, Saijo and Yamato (2002), for 
example, find that Japanese subjects are more inclined to punish low contributions in a public 
good game than are US subjects.3 
                                                 
2 In the canonical ultimatum game, one subject proposes a division of a fixed sum with an anonymous 
counterpart, and the counterpart may accept, in which case the sum is divided as proposed, or reject, in 
which case both receive nothing. 
3 Their study also indicates that US and Japanese subject pool effects are mostly due to national 
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Although this topic is typically described as one of “culture,” there are at least two 
reasons to differentiate culture and nationality. First, multiple countries might share a common 
culture (e.g., arguably North and South Korea), and multiple cultures might exist within a single 
country (e.g., Switzerland and the US). Second, culture and nationality can be seen as different 
possible social identities. Social identity refers to a sense of membership in a group, and that 
group might be defined in terms of national identity (US or Japan) or cultural identity (e.g., 
individualism or collectivism).4 To our knowledge, this study is unique by allowing examination 
of both cultural and national dimensions of the equity-equality trade-off. Although it is typically 
clear what nationality means, culture requires some further discussion. 
Since Hofstede (1980), most cross-cultural research makes a distinction between 
individualism and collectivism, i.e., the degree to which people act as individuals or as members 
of a group. With regard to distributive justice, a frequent claim is that people in 
Western/individualistic countries prefer equity, whereas members of Eastern/collectivist 
countries prefer equality. This claim finds support in the results of some questionnaire studies, 
for example, see Kashima et al. (1988) and the meta-analysis of Sama and Papamarcos (2000). 
As a mostly collectivist society, Japan has traditionally experienced one of the lowest levels of 
income inequality in world, which Tachibanaki (2005) attributes to the strong “egalitarian 
principle prevalent among the Japanese” (pg.110).5 At the opposite extreme, the individualistic 
US has one of the highest levels of income inequality among developed countries, which Alesina 
and Angeletos (2005) trace, in part, to fairness views that tolerate higher inequality. On the other 
hand, the meta-analysis of Fischer and Smith (2003) suggests the need for a more complex 
account of culture and its relationship to distributive preferences. One oft cited proposal for a 
richer measure of culture is the two dimensional individualism-collectivism instrument 
developed by Singelis et al. (1995). In section 2, we discuss this measure in greater detail and its 
                                                                                                                                                             
differences rather than institutional differences: their experiment was conducted at two universities in the 
US and two in Japan, and they found significant between-country differences but comparatively minor 
within-country differences. 
4 For an economic treatment of identity, see Akerlof and Kranton (2000). In the following subsection on 
demographic variables, we consider other traits that are often used to define social identity, e.g., race, 
gender, age and income. 
5 Although inequality has increased substantially in Japan in recent decades, this does not necessarily 
reflect a change in values. Rather, Ohtake and Saito (1998) point out that the income distribution by age 
has remained relatively constant, and they attribute the increasing overall inequality to Japan’s rapidly 
aging population. 
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role in the present study. 
Our design strategy for examining cultural effects also produces variation in additional 
variables, so we discuss the literature related to them here, even though they are actually 
structural variables. Dictator giving can depend on whether decisions are individual or group, 
and Cason and Mui (1997) show the sequence of both types of decisions can affect these choices 
in subtle ways. An inverse relationship between the level of subject anonymity and pro-social 
behaviour has been found in studies of social distance among both Western and Asian subjects, 
e.g., Hoffman, McCabe and Smith (1996) and Buchan and Croson (2004), respectively. In 
addition, pro-social behaviour often increases with communication among subjects. For example, 
Charness and Gneezy (2008) find dictators are more generous, when they know the family 
names of their counterparts. Both Western and Asian subjects are both more trusting and more 
trustworthy in Buchan, Johnson and Croson (2006), when communication is personal (about 
something related to their birthdays), but their behaviour is unaffected by impersonal 
communication. We see these findings as suggesting a unifying characteristic we will call 
proximity, which signifies how personal the relationship is between parties. Thus, relationships 
are more proximate, according to this concept, if people belong to a group, are non-anonymous, 
and may communicate, a point to which we will return in the interpretation of our own results. 
1.3 Demographic Variables 
Many experimental studies have examined the relationship between distributive 
preferences and demographic variables, so we also elicit information from subjects about gender, 
race, age and various economic measures. In their survey of gender differences in preferences, 
Croson and Gneezy (2009) report that the evidence on dictator giving is mixed, although women 
are usually more inequality averse than men. There are conflicting results on the interaction of 
dictator and recipient gender: women sometimes give more and sometimes less to other women. 
The evidence on race and social preferences is similarly mixed. For example, blacks are more 
generous in the ultimatum study of Eckel and Grossman (2001). On the other hand, the race of 
donor and recipient does not significantly affect average dictator giving to victims of Hurricane 
Katrina in Fong and Luttmer (2009), although giving is sensitive to donors’ reported closeness to 
their own racial group. In a meta-analysis of dictator games, Engel (2011) finds a significant 
positive correlation between giving and age. 
Finally, the evidence on giving and economic class is mixed. Studies of non-anonymous 
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charitable giving routinely find a positive relationship between income class and absolute giving 
(e.g., see the evidence cited in Andreoni, 1990). On the other hand, Piff et al. (2010) report an 
inverse correlation between economic class and anonymous generosity, measured both as 
dictator giving and as charitable donations. Bracha and Vesterlund (2013) hypothesise that 
giving can confer two types of status, economic and generosity, which makes the income-giving 
relationship ambiguous. Their results provide a means to reconcile the seemingly contradictory 
evidence and also underscore the importance of anonymity for the identification of intrinsically 
motivated generosity. Using a representative sample of children, Almås, Cappelen, Salvanes, 
Sørensen and Tungodden (2016) find spectators with low socio-economic class allocate more 
equally, whereas higher status dictators allocate more equitably. 
1.4 Methodological Variables 
A common question about social preference experiments is whether the departures from 
narrow self-interest they often reveal diminish, or even vanish, with larger stakes, such as those 
sometimes encountered outside the laboratory. Camerer (2003) reviews the results of ultimatum 
games with varying stakes, including ones up to several month’s wages, and concludes there is 
comparatively little variation in offers and rejections. Using dictator and ultimatum games, 
Forsythe et al. (1994) report significant differences between zero stakes and positive stakes but 
find even very modest stakes produce the same behaviour as larger ones. In these studies, stakes 
can rightly be considered a methodological variable, since the question is one of salience and 
external validity (i.e., relevance to behaviour outside the laboratory). Although we keep with 
Camerer by listing stakes in this sub-section, we actually treat it as a structural variable that 
potentially affects fairness preferences themselves. We raise two distinct questions about stakes. 
First, previous work shows that dictator allocations differ significantly depending on 
whether the decision maker is a stakeholder or a spectator, e.g., see the literature cited in Konow 
(2012). In the standard dictator game, the dictator is a stakeholder, whose anonymous decision 
affects his own payoff. In the spectator version of the dictator game, a third party chooses the 
allocation of a fixed sum between two other anonymous subjects, and the spectator is paid a 
fixed fee that is invariant with respect to his decision. Whereas spectators are presumed to 
choose impartially, stakeholders can, due to their material self-interest, be expected to allocate 
more, on average, to themselves than would spectators. The less obvious question, which we 
pose here, is whether the fact of having a personal stake in the decision at hand also affects the 
 9 
equity-equality trade-off. That is, do impartial (and impersonal) spectators act on a different 
fairness rule from parties in a more personal relationship, like stakeholders? If so, this could have 
important implications for distribution, e.g., judges are ideally impartial third parties typically 
bound to the legal principle of proportionality, whereas co-workers can perhaps be seen attaching 
a greater weight to equality. 
Second, focusing now on personal stakes, the research cited above finds little effect of the 
size of stakes on willingness to act on fairness preferences. But a separate question is whether the 
size of stakes affects what people consider fair, i.e., the equity-equality trade-off. According to 
Güth (1988), the early literature on justice in social psychology supports proportionality as the 
basic rule of distributive justice, but it also finds that small stakes are often associated with 
equality. We ask, therefore, whether higher personal stakes increase the relative importance of 
equity and believe ours in the first economics experiment to address this question. This issue is 
not confined to the laboratory, though, but mirrors issues of the appropriate distributive rule in 
the field. For example, friends and colleagues often “split the tab” in restaurants, when the bill is 
comparatively small, to avoid various costs, including goodwill, of a more exact reckoning. 
2. Experiment and Hypotheses 
2.1 Design and Hypotheses 
There are two main phases to the experiment. In the production phase, twelve subjects in 
room X and twelve in room Y perform a task that generates earnings. Specifically, they prepare 
letters for mailing, and earnings are the product of the number of letters and a constant credit per 
letter that is common to all subjects and treatments. Usually, subjects differ considerably in their 
performance on this task and, therefore, in the earnings that can be attributed to them 
individually. Subjects are then matched into pairs, whereby the matching protocol takes 
advantage of variation in performance to maximise the productivity difference within each 
session. In a standard session, the most productive X subject is matched with the least productive 
Y subject, the second most productive X subject with the second least productive Y subject, etc. 
In the subsequent allocation phase, the earnings of matched subjects are pooled, and their joint 
earnings are allocated among them dictator style. The treatment differences all pertain to the 
allocation phase, specifically, with respect to the exact pooling of subject earnings and the 
identity of the dictators, which we now describe. 
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The design is constructed so as to minimise non-preference-based reasons for equality. 
Except where noted below, individual performance is common knowledge so as to avoid the 
aforementioned ceteris paribus rationale for equalising earnings. The matching protocol produces 
very few instances of actual equal productivity between members of a pair. In addition, the letter 
preparation task employed here has proven very effective in conveying entitlement in past 
research, e.g., Carpenter et al. (2010) and Falk and Ichino (2006). Its efficacy in the current 
experiment is reaffirmed by the observed allocation decisions and responses to a post-
experimental questionnaire, which are reported later in the results section. 
The experiment comprises three treatments. We now describe the first two treatments, in 
which all subjects are aware of other subjects and their roles but are anonymous, i.e., they do not 
know the identities of other subjects. In the Spectator treatment, there are twelve spectators, or 
third party subjects, located in a third room, called Z. Each Z subject is matched with a single 
X/Y pair. Spectators are informed of the number of letters individually prepared by X and Y and 
are paid a fixed fee, unrelated to their allocation decisions, for distributing the joint earnings 
generated by their X and Y counterparts between them. The Anonymous Stakeholder treatment 
is closer to the standard version of the dictator game. Subjects in rooms X and Y (again twelve 
each) first generate earnings and are then matched into pairs as in the Spectator treatment, but 
there is no third party Z. Instead, X subjects are arbitrarily chosen to allocate the earnings 
generated by their pair between themselves and their Y counterparts. Each X subject does this 
only for his or her pair. Thus, the only difference between the Anonymous Stakeholder and 
Spectator decisions is whether or not the dictator is also a party to the earnings being distributed. 
The labels and main features of these two treatments are summarised in the top two rubrics of 
Figure 1. 
 
FIGURE 1. Experimental Design 
 
Treatment Decision Dictator Recipients Anonymity 
Spectator     Spectator Z X, Y Anonymous 
Anonymous 
Stakeholder 
    Anonymous 
    Stakeholder 
X X, Y Anonymous 
 
Group 
Stakeholder 
1. Group Group X Group X, 
Group Y 
Anonymous 
 
2. Known 
    Stakeholder 
XA 
YA 
XA, XB 
YA, YB 
Known 
 
→ 
→ 
→ 
→ 
→ 
→ 
 11 
The Spectator treatment seeks to identify impartial distributive preferences, which are 
potentially useful for the various purposes listed in the introduction, viz., to evaluate or inform 
normative theory, policy, and stakeholders. The intent here is to utilise spectators to provide the 
clearest possible signal of impartial fairness rules, in light of the fact that stakeholders have been 
found to form biased beliefs about fairness, even their entitlements are equal (see Di Tella et al., 
2015). Spectators in this experiment, by contrast, have no material or informational basis for 
distorting beliefs. It is also important to study the choices of stakeholders, however, since most 
situations in which distributive preferences are implicated involve parties with stakes in the 
outcome, e.g., workers, management, stockholders, resource owners, polluters, etc. Having both 
spectator and stakeholder decisions enables us to make several important comparisons. First, the 
strength of self-interest relative to fairness can be associated with different levels of giving 
between stakeholders and spectators. Second, the fairness rule of equity predicts that giving will 
vary in proportion to the entitlement, whereas equality rule predicts no such changes. So, any 
differences between spectator and stakeholder giving in response to changes in the entitlement 
will shed light on how each weights these two rules. Third, having both spectator and 
stakeholder decisions facilitates separate testing of possible national and cultural differences in 
the strength of fairness preferences and in fairness rules, a topic to which we now turn. 
 
FIGURE 2. Nationality Hypothesis 
 
 Spectator Anonymous 
Stakeholder 
Japan = ½ ≥ ½ 
United States = ∝ ≥ ∝ 
Notes: These are amounts allocated to subject X. The second symbol in each cell 
represents the fairness rule, either equal splits (½) or proportionality (∝). The first symbol 
is the standard mathematical operator, indicating allocations to X are either equal to (=) 
or greater than or equal to (≥) amounts that correspond to the respective rule. 
 
Regarding nationality, there are four reasons we chose the US and Japan for this study. 
First, a large volume of experimental economic research has been conducted in the US and 
Japan, both separately and in joint cross-cultural investigations. This fact facilitates connections 
between this study and others and, thereby, could help bolster claims of generality. Second, they 
are two of the three largest economies in the world and represent, therefore, a substantial fraction 
of world economic activity. Third, the US and Japan are often said to represent two sides of the 
most commonly cited cultural divide, viz., Eastern collectivism versus Western individualism. 
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Fourth, our chief interest is in preferences for equality versus inequality, and much cross-national 
research (e.g., see section 1.2) places these two countries at opposite poles on this issue. Building 
on this final point, the Nationality Hypothesis states that Japanese subjects value equality and 
that US subjects value equity, as summarised Figure 2. Specifically, Japanese spectators seek to 
set amounts equal to equal splits, denoted = ½, whereas US spectators set allocations 
proportionately, denoted = ∝. Anonymous stakeholders are motivated not only by fairness but 
also by material self-interest. Assuming the full range of possible weights on these two motives, 
they are predicted to allocate to themselves an amount greater than or equal to their respective 
fairness rule, either equality in Japan (≥ ½) or proportionality in the US (≥ ∝).  
Although we call this the Nationality Hypothesis, if true, it could be an instance of the 
more general cultural claim outlined in section 1.2 that justice in collectivist societies 
corresponds to equality and in individualistic societies to equity. To examine this, the post-
experimental questionnaire includes an individualism-collectivism (IC) measure.6 Specifically, 
we employ the IC measure of Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk and Gelfand (1995), hereafter STBG, 
which comprises 32 items that respondents rate on a nine point scale. Although this construct is 
one of the most cited IC instruments, most cultural psychologists acknowledge that it has been 
notoriously difficult to develop satisfactory IC measures based on self-reports. These measures 
have proven especially vulnerable in terms of reliability, i.e., their ability to produce stable and 
consistent results over time and with different samples. An alternate approach is to activate 
cultural identity in the laboratory. To this end, we separately design an experimental treatment 
based on the theoretical framework of STBG but using behavioural rather than self-reported IC 
measures. An important reason for choosing the STBG framework, apart from its richer 
conceptualization and widespread usage, is that it is nicely adaptable to an economics experiment 
and, in particular, to our focus on equity and equality. 
The theory behind the STBG construct involves two dimensions. Along one dimension, it 
distinguishes collectivism (C) as a cultural pattern in which people favour in-groups over out-
groups from individualism (I), which makes no such distinctions, i.e., people are autonomous. 
An in-group (out-group) is a set of people with whom one shares (does not share) an identity, 
such as friends, family, team, nationality, culture, gender, race, etc. The second dimension 
                                                 
6 In addition, if the hypothesized behavioural relationship obtains, the IC measure could help avert a 
possible ecological fallacy, e.g., the inference from a relationship at the national level that collectivists 
favour equality, when individually they actually prefer equity. 
 13 
distinguishes horizontal (H) relationships, which are based on equality, from vertical (V) ones, 
which are based on inequality. This produces four cultural variations: HC, VC, HI and VI.7 
Among theories of culture, this one lends itself well to the current topic. Nevertheless, like other 
such theories, it is not formulated in terms of distributive justice, so we now add some flesh to it. 
 
FIGURE 3. HVIC Hypothesis 
 
  Group Individual/ 
Known Stakeholder 
HC 
Japan 
> ½ = ½ 
VC > ½ = ∝ 
HI = ½ = ½ 
VI US = ½ = ∝ 
Notes: These are amounts allocated to one’s in-group (Group column) and to oneself 
(Individual/Known Stakeholder column), according to the four STBG-inspired cultural 
variations. Amounts are either greater than (>) or equal to (=) the equal split rule (½) or 
the proportionality rule (∝). In the Group Stakeholder treatment, Group corresponds to 
the Group decision and Individual to the Known Stakeholder decision. 
 
Specifically, we take the IC dimension to refer to group preferences and collectivism to 
imply that in-groups consider it acceptable to have larger shares than out-groups. Individualism, 
on the other hand, implies no such distinctions so that in- and out-groups are treated equally. 
Further, we take the HV dimension to refer to allocations between individuals within in-groups 
with horizontal implying equal splits between individuals and vertical implying equitable (i.e., 
proportional) allocations between individuals. We call this interpretation of the STBG 
framework the “HVIC Hypothesis” and illustrate it in Figure 3. In Group allocations, 
collectivists prefer a larger share for their own group, denoted for HC and VC as > ½, whereas 
individualists make no group distinctions and prefer equal allocations across groups, denoted for 
HI and VI as = ½. For Individual allocations within groups, horizontal collectivists and 
individualists both prefer equality within their group, denoted for HC and HI as = ½, whereas 
vertical collectivists and individualists prefer equity within their group, denoted for VC and VI 
as = ∝ (disregard the “Known Stakeholder” label for now). If we wish explicitly to factor in a 
self-interested bias, it is straightforward to adjust this table: we replace “=” with “≥” and 
                                                 
7 For the self-report instrument, subjects respond to statements on a scale from 1 to 9, and each culture 
scale is formed by simple addition of these responses for its respective eight questions. The individual 
items can be found in the Appendix, whereby HI is formed from questions 1-8, VI from 9-16 (with 16 
reverse scored), HC from 17-24, and VC from 25-32. 
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additionally require for Groups that HC and VC be strictly greater than HI and VI.8 According to 
STBG, the United States is VI, whereas Japan has a mixed pattern: more VC than anything else 
and overall more C than I, so we assign it to both HC and VC. As an alternative to self-reports, 
therefore, we formulate a test based on this assignment of countries to cultural patterns. Thus, for 
Individual, Japan is between equity and equality, and the HI cell is left empty in this study. 
The HVIC Hypothesis posits cultural differences in distributive preferences based on 
distinctions between and within groups. We seek to activate those preferences in the laboratory 
by creating in-groups. For that purpose, we draw on a separate literature on induced group 
identity. Psychologists have conducted a large number of experiments employing a method 
called the “minimal group paradigm” (e.g., Tajfel and Turner, 1979), which has also been used in 
economics experiments (e.g., Chen and Li, 2009). Most of these studies reveal that subjects 
exhibit favouritism toward in-groups that are constructed on such trivial bases as art preferences, 
final digits of social security numbers, or even random assignment to colour-coded groups. 
Goette, Huffman and Meier (2012), however, find quantitative differences in social preferences 
between such “minimal groups,” who do not interact, and groups randomly assigned to real 
social interactions. Their subjects comprised Swiss officers in training, who had interacted all 
day over several weeks, and Goette et al. were able to maintain anonymity during their 
experiment. By contrast, our study requires a more diverse subject pool and permits only brief 
interaction. Therefore, we form groups without anonymity in order, inter alia, to strengthen 
group identity. There are several other benefits of this design choice, including greater external 
validity (social interaction is not usually anonymous) and the ability to examine possible effects 
of knowing the gender or race of counterparts. A potential source of noise, however, is if 
subjects know one another outside the laboratory – we sought to minimise this by assigning any 
subjects who showed up together or appeared to be acquainted to different rooms, where they 
would not be non-anonymously matched. 
We tested the HVIC Hypothesis with the Group Stakeholder treatment, which is 
illustrated in the bottom of Figure 1 above. This treatment begins with the same production phase 
as the other treatments, but the allocation phase involves two stages and a different matching 
protocol (described momentarily). Instead of pairs, subjects are initially matched into quadruples 
                                                 
8 One might interpret the STBG theory differently from these two variations, of course, but the 
experiment requires the choice of a design and, by implication, an interpretation, and this version strikes 
us as the most reasonable and experimentally implementable one. 
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consisting of two X subjects, called XA and XB who form Group X, and two Y subjects, called 
YA and YB who form Group Y, and the earnings of all four subjects are pooled. The first 
allocation is the Group decision. XA and XB subjects are re-seated to meet face-to-face, are 
informed of the total production and earnings of their quadruple, and jointly choose how much to 
take for their in-group (Group X) and how much to give to the out-group (Group Y). YA and YB 
also meet face-to-face and are informed of what they receive from Group X. After five minutes, 
A and B subjects in both rooms return to their original seats. Although A and B subjects in both 
rooms meet with one other, X and Y groups never meet and remain anonymous to one another. 
The second decision in this treatment is an individual one. Subject XA is arbitrarily 
chosen to allocate the Group X earnings they just selected for themselves between himself and 
his XB counterpart. Similarly, the YA subject is arbitrarily chosen to distribute the earnings 
Group X gave to them in the earlier decision between herself and her YB counterpart. These 
decisions are all made individually, but they are not anonymous: A and B subjects have met and 
know one another’s identity. This Known Stakeholder decision is similar to the Anonymous 
Stakeholder decision in that the dictators are individual stakeholders with knowledge of 
individual production but differs in that they are known by and to the recipients. In terms of 
Figure 3, therefore, the Group decision corresponds to the predictions in the Group column and 
the Known Stakeholder decision to those in the Individual column. 
The matching mechanism in the Group Stakeholder treatment is a bit more involved than 
in the other treatments. In each room, A and B subjects are separately matched so as to maximise 
productivity differences, i.e., the most productive A with the least productive B, etc., analogous 
to the subject X and Y pairings in the other treatments. Then these X groups (each consisting of 
an XA and XB) and Y groups (consisting of YA and YB) are matched to form quadruples, 
specifically, the most productive X group is matched with the most productive Y group, the 
second most productive X group with the second to most productive Y group, etc. This results in 
large average differences in productivity between A and B subjects but small productivity 
differences between X groups and Y groups. 
For the Group decision, Group X is told only the total, but not individual or group, 
production and earnings of their quadruple. There are several reasons for this. The HVIC 
Hypothesis is not predicated on, or committed to, a rule of equity or equality. Instead, it simply 
asserts group favouritism to one’s in-group among collectivists but not among individualists. 
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Without relevant information, previous research cited in section 1 indicates subjects typically 
make the ceteris paribus and assume equality applies. In fact, the matching protocol described 
above generates small productivity differences between X and Y Groups. At the same time, 
providing information only about total productivity likely helps create larger differences between 
Group X and Y pies, which is needed to study the effect of the size of stakes on the choice of 
fairness rule.9 In addition, the Group Stakeholder treatment allows comparison of the degree of 
self-interest by groups (or teams) versus individuals (e.g., as Cason and Mui, 1997) and makes 
possible analysis of nationality and of effects of groups on the choice of equity or equality. 
2.2 Procedures 
A total of 432 subjects participated in this experiment: 144 in the Spectator treatment, 96 
in the Anonymous Stakeholder treatment and 192 in the Group Stakeholder treatment. Each of 
these totals consisted of equal numbers drawn from the undergraduate campuses of universities 
in Los Angeles, California and Osaka, Japan. These are comparably sized metropolitan areas, 
both the second largest in their respective countries. Subjects were invited by campus wide 
emails and flyers posted around campus to sign up at designated websites. Participants were 
recruited from different disciplines and screened to exclude non-citizens. All sessions had twelve 
subjects per room, and the Spectator treatment was conducted with three rooms (X, Y and Z), or 
36 subjects total, per session, whereas the Anonymous Stakeholder and Group Stakeholder 
treatments each involved two rooms (X and Y), or 24 subjects total, per session. All subjects 
initially showed up at a single location to register and receive their show up fees in order to 
dispel doubts about the existence of counterparts in other rooms (see Frohlich, Oppenheimer and 
Moore, 2001, for evidence on the effects of such doubts). They were then randomly assigned to 
separate rooms except for adjustments to balance gender and to break up acquaintances. 
Subjects are told that there are two phases of the experiment and then given more specific 
instructions for the first, or production, phase.10 Each letter correctly prepared in the six minutes 
                                                 
9 Specifically, there is little actual variation in the total stakes of dictator/recipient pairs in the other 
decisions of this experiment, but the self-interest of X groups in the Group decision represents a natural 
way to create variation in Group X and Y pies. This, in turn, allows us to study the effect of the size of 
stakes on the fairness rule, in this case, those acted on by A subjects in the subsequent Known 
Stakeholder decision. Moreover, providing information about group productivity might overly limit 
variance in these stakes given the previously cited research that known entitlements significantly reduce 
self-interest. 
10 As in previous experiments of this kind, subjects were initially only informed in general terms about 
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allotted generates 100 points, which is also stated in local currency (i.e., US dollar or Japanese 
yen). After the task is complete and the letters counted, the pooling of earnings for their 
particular treatment is explained, the dictators are identified for the first time (although they are 
merely identified as subjects X or Z), and dictators are given five minutes to allocate points 
between subjects. For the Group Stakeholder treatment, X groups are first given five minutes to 
allocate the total earnings of the quadruple between themselves and the Y group.11 Then, the 
Known Stakeholder allocations take place: the A subjects in each room are given five minutes to 
allocate the group X (or Y) totals between themselves and B subjects. All subjects then complete 
a questionnaire, which includes demographic questions, questions about distributive preferences 
and the STBG instrument. Finally, subjects are paid privately and permitted to leave. Altogether, 
sessions lasted, on average, about 50 minutes. 
Show-up fees were $5 in the US and 750 yen in Japan, and each letter in the US earned 
$1 (1 point = 1 cent) and in Japan earned 150 yen (1 point = 1.5 yen). These parameters resulted 
in average total earnings of $18.14 in the US and 2121 yen in Japan, approximately equal 
amounts in purchasing power parity using contemporaneous OECD conversion rates.12 The 
instructions were written in English, translated into Japanese and then back-translated by a 
separate translator into English to check for consistency. The first author was present at both 
locations to verify that the recruitment, procedures, and even physical set-up were equivalent. 
For language reasons and in order not arouse suspicion, the experiment was conducted solely by 
Americans in the US and Japanese in Japan, and the lead experimenter in the dictator rooms 
(except for the YA decisions) was always the same person (Konow in the US and Akai in Japan). 
The experimental protocol is contained in the Appendix. 
3. Results and Analysis 
The presentation and analysis of results follows the outline of section 1. 
                                                                                                                                                             
allocation procedures in order to avoid any effect on effort and productivity in the first phase that might 
subsequently impact allocations and confound inferences about distributive motives. The experiment was 
partially, but not completely, computerized for logistical reasons, viz., one of the labs did not have 
separate computerized rooms, but the use of pencil and paper for allocation decisions probably also 
helped reinforce that dictator decisions were anonymous to recipients. For practical reasons, though, 
decisions were not blind to the experimenter. 
11 The X groups are told that, if at the end of the five minutes they fail to agree, one of the X subjects will 
be randomly chosen to decide, although it never came to that. 
12 These earnings seemed sufficient: after receiving their payments, 99% of American subjects and 94% 
of Japanese subjects responded that they would be willing to participate in other economics experiments. 
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3.1 Structural Variables 
We consider first summary statistics for all four decisions in the experiment. Table 1 
summarises the mean allocations to X (or A, in the case of Known Stakeholders) as fractions of 
total earnings of pairs for the four decisions. The entitlement is the mean fraction of earnings 
produced by X or A, respectively. Below these are two-tail t-tests of differences between mean 
allocations and mean entitlements and between mean allocations and equal splits, respectively. 
We see Spectator allocations do not, on average, differ significantly from either equity (i.e., the 
mean entitlement, using paired t-tests) or equality, whereas Anonymous Stakeholder allocations 
to themselves significantly exceed both their mean entitlement and equality. We reserve detailed 
discussion of the Group Stakeholder treatment for the following section but note at this point that 
Known Stakeholders and Group Stakeholders take more than their respective entitlements and 
equality, although these differences vary in size and significance. These results are consistent 
with all groups being motivated by fairness and with the additional effect of material self-interest 
on stakeholders, but it does not tell us whether the governing fairness rule is equity and equality. 
 
Table 1 
SUMMARY OF MEAN RESULTS 
 
           Anonymous       Known   Group 
            Spectator      Stakeholder     Stakeholder      Stakeholder  
Allocations 
    Mean   0.45    0.57    0.54    0.59 
    (Std. Err.) (0.036) (0.029) (0.015) (0.023) 
 
Entitlements 
    Mean   0.45    0.49    0.52    0.46 
    (Std. Err.) (0.033) (0.028) (0.019) (0.006) 
 
Difference mean allocation and mean entitlement 
    t-statistic −0.02    2.95    1.29    5.72 
    p-value  0.985   0.005   0.200  <0.001 
 
Difference mean allocation and equality 
    t-statistic −1.42    2.31    3.06    4.04 
    p-value  0.161   0.025   0.002  <0.001 
 
No. of obs.    48      48     91     48 
 
Notes: The differences in means between allocations and entitlements employ paired t-
tests. There are only 91 decisions by Known stakeholders (48 XA and 43 YA subjects), 
because five of the 48 X Groups allocated nothing to their Y Groups leaving no decisions 
for the corresponding five YA subjects. 
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Table 2 presents a simple but more disaggregated summary of the results. It categorises 
each decision into one of three types, viz., proportional, equal or selfish, based on a calculation 
of whether it is closest in absolute terms from its respective entitlement, equality or giving X (or 
A in the Known Stakeholder decision) the entire pie (ties are counted one-half to each type). The 
first column illustrates that 81% of Spectator decisions are closest to being proportional and 19% 
to being equal (the selfish category is not applicable here, since the dictators in this treatment are 
third parties). The percentage of proportional decisions falls to 57% and the percentage of equal 
ones rises to 30% for Anonymous Stakeholders, while 13% of decisions are closest to the 
completely selfish allocation. Further gains in equality and losses in equity are apparent for 
Known Stakeholders, while selfish allocations fall somewhat. Finally, we see that, although 
Group Stakeholders deviate, on average, significantly toward self-interest, as reported above, 
only 11% are closest to taking the entire earnings whereas 83% of their allocations are closer to 
equality. Only 6% are closest to being proportional, presumably by chance, since these dictators 
receive no information about relative production. Moreover, regression analysis shows that 
group entitlements do not significantly affect group allocations. As the remaining analysis in this 
sub-section concerns the entitlement, we therefore focus below on the three individual decisions. 
 
Table 2 
TYPE OF ALLOCATION BY DECISION 
(percentage of each type) 
 Dictator Decision 
Allocation 
Type Spectator 
Anonymous 
Stakeholder 
Known 
Stakeholder 
Group 
Stakeholder 
Proportional 81 57 45 6 
Equal 19 30 49 83 
Selfish NA 13 6 11 
 
The dictator allocations of Z subjects in the Spectator treatment are illustrated in Figure 
4a. The horizontal axis represents the fraction of letters produced by the X subject and the 
vertical axis the fraction of earnings allocated to the same X subject by the Spectator. If 
spectators value equality, the allocations should lie along a horizontal line at 0.5. Equity, on the 
other hand, calls for proportionality: fair allocations, or the entitlement, lie along the lighter 45 
degree line where fractional allocations equal fractional contributions (ignore the dark lines for 
now). Apart from a few outliers, most decisions appear to be quite close to the entitlement. 
Figure 4b presents the results of the Anonymous Stakeholder treatment. The points refer 
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again to the X subjects, but the fractional earnings on the vertical axis are those chosen by the X 
subjects to themselves (rather than those chosen by a third party). As with Spectators, a number 
of these allocations equal the entitlement, but departures from this line are more prominent. The 
Known Stakeholder treatment in Figure 4c illustrates the dictator allocations of A subjects in 
rooms X and Y to themselves, which appears to include a greater incidence of equality. 
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Figure 4. Dictator Allocations 
 
These impressions are reinforced and further illuminated by regression analysis. The dark 
lines in Figure 4 result from the following OLS regression of fractional allocations on fractional 
entitlements for the three individual decisions: 
 (1)  Allocationi = a + b·Entitlementi + εi 
Equality corresponds to an intercept of one-half (a=0.5) and a slope of zero (b=0), 
whereas equity predicts an intercept of zero (a=0) and a slope of one (b=1). Since the dependent 
variable is left- and right-censored, however, we also run two-sided Tobit regressions for these 
and the other regressions reported in this paper.13 Table 3 reports these regressions and the 
results of F-tests of the joint hypotheses for the equity and equality cases. For the Spectator 
decisions, there is strong support for equity and no support for equality, confirming the 
impressions from Table 2 and Figure 4. Allocations in the two stakeholder decisions, however, 
fall between equity and equality and differ significantly from those two sets of predictions, as 
                                                 
13 For the findings reported in this paper, OLS and Tobit regressions result in conclusions that are 
qualitatively, and even quantitatively, very close. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile establishing the 
robustness of the results, given the focus of this study on preferences for equality: stakeholders who 
allocate in a more self-interested manner might result in disproportionate censoring of the allocations of 
more productive dictators and lower OLS slope coefficients, even if their fairness rule were equity. This is 
a problem of right censored data with OLS, which these Tobit regressions correct. 
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seen in Table 3. Comparing slope coefficients to those of Spectators, dictators equalise more as 
Anonymous Stakeholders (t-statistic=–2.12, p<0.05) and even more as Known Stakeholders (t-
statistic=–3.97, p<0.01). Joint tests of the hypothesis of no change in intercepts and slopes 
similarly indicate significant differences between Spectator allocations and those of Anonymous 
Stakeholders (F-statistic=5.34, p<.01) and Known Stakeholders (F-statistic=10.55, p<.01). The 
highly significant slope coefficients in all three regressions demonstrate that the entitlement, and 
therefore equity, matters in every condition, although to differing degrees. On average, spectators 
allocate according to equity, whereas Anonymous and Known Stakeholders respond to but are 
less sensitive than spectators to differences in entitlement. 
 
Table 3 
TOBIT REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
             Anonymous       Known 
            Spectator        Stakeholder     Stakeholder  
Intercept              0.01   0.24***  0.30*** 
    (0.049) (0.072) (0.037) 
 
Entitlement   0.96***   0.67***  0.47*** 
    (0.097) (0.138) (0.067) 
 
F-statistics 
   Equity (a=0, b=1)  0.11   7.61*** 33.16*** 
   Equality (a=0.5, b=0) 52.39*** 15.67*** 31.40*** 
 
Adjusted R2   0.70   0.33   0.34 
 
No. of obs.    48    48    91 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Adjusted R2 are from OLS. 
Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1% level. 
 
We also examine whether dictator allocations are related to other distributive preferences 
than those activated by the entitlement. The post-experimental questionnaire includes five 
questions that elicit agreement on a four point Likert scale with statements about subject control 
over performance on the experimental task, basic needs, guaranteed income, and whether 
efficiency is promoted by minimizing differences in pay (equality) or by paying workers 
according to productivity (equity). Tobit regressions reported in Table A1 of the Appendix add 
the five responses to the right side of regression (1). They show that the entitlement remains 
highly significant and nearly identical in magnitude across the three treatments while none of the 
five questions is significant at conventional levels. Regarding control, 79% of subjects agreed or 
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strongly agreed that performance on the task was due to things they could control, thereby 
satisfying a more stringent criterion for entitlement, but the regression results suggest that even 
dissenters on this question accepted the experimental task as a fair basis for allocation. 
3.2 Culture and Nationality 
The Nationality Hypothesis predicts Japanese will allocate equally and Americans 
equitably with a possible self-interested bias in the case of Anonymous Stakeholders. Table 4 
summarises the results of Table 1 broken down by country (minus the Known and Group 
Stakeholder decisions, which we present later). Consistent with the Nationality Hypothesis, there 
are no significant differences between mean Spectator allocations and entitlements in the US or 
between mean Spectator allocations and equal splits in the Japan. The results for Anonymous 
Stakeholders are also consistent the predictions, which involve weak inequalities: the mean US 
allocation significantly exceeds the entitlement, and the mean Japanese allocation exceeds 
equality, although not significantly so. These results are mostly inconclusive about the core 
claims of the hypothesis, though, so we turn now to regression analysis to test its stronger claims 
regarding equity and equality. 
TABLE 4 
MEAN RESULTS FOR SPECTATOR AND ANONYMOUS STAKEHOLDER 
        ALLOCATIONS BY COUNTRY 
 
              Anonymous  
   Spectator           Stakeholder  
                US   Japan     US   Japan  
Allocations 
    Mean   0.40    0.50    0.57    0.57  
    (Std. Err.) (0.058) (0.039) (0.040) (0.044) 
 
Entitlements 
    Mean   0.38    0.52    0.47    0.52  
    (Std. Err.) (0.053) (0.037) (0.047) (0.023) 
 
Difference mean allocation and mean entitlement 
    t-statistic   0.50  –0.718    3.00    1.29  
    p-value  0.622    0.479   0.006   0.208  
 
Difference mean allocation and equality 
    t-statistic –1.77     0.04    1.70    1.55  
    p-value  0.090    0.967   0.103   0.134  
 
No. of obs.    24      24     24     24  
 
Notes: The differences in means between allocations and entitlements employ paired t-tests. 
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Table 5 summarises Tobit regressions that parallel Table 3 but are additionally broken 
down by country. The results are very close to those in Table 3: dictators in the US and Japan 
allocate similarly within treatments, and the allocations of both subject pools respond similarly to 
treatment differences. Spectators in both the US and Japan allocate equitably and not equally, 
according to F-tests. Anonymous Stakeholders in both countries equalise more, on average, 
departing from equity (in Japan, the F-test for Tobit is weakly significant with p=0.078 whereas 
OLS gives a p=0.026). We return to the Known Stakeholders later but note for now that we 
observe, compared to Anonymous Stakeholders, the same pattern from Table 3 of even greater 
equality and reduced equity in allocations in both countries. Thus, the evidence on the 
Nationality Hypothesis is mixed and mostly negative. Consistent with the hypothesis, US 
Spectators allocate equitably, and Stakeholders in both countries allocate to themselves no less 
than the fair amount. But, contrary to the hypothesis, Japanese Spectators also allocate equitably 
rather than equally. And Anonymous Stakeholders in both countries follow, on average, 
something between equity and equality, rather than equity in the US and equality in Japan. 
 
TABLE 5 
TOBIT REGRESSION RESULTS BY COUNTRY 
 
              Anonymous             Known 
   Spectator           Stakeholder           Stakeholder            
                US   Japan     US   Japan    US    Japan     
Intercept  –0.01    0.04    0.22*    0.23**  0.33***  0.27*** 
  (0.070) (0.072) (0.116) (0.099)  (0.068) (0.040) 
 
Entitlement   1.06***   0.88***   0.75***   0.66***  0.44***  0.49*** 
  (0.156) (0.132) (0.239) (0.175)  (0.126) (0.071) 
 
F-statistics 
   Equity  0.09   0.71    5.27**   2.86*   12.33*** 26.12*** 
   Equality 27.32*** 22.36***   7.07***   8.85***  10.85*** 26.39*** 
 
Adjusted R2  0.69   0.65    0.28    0.37    0.22   0.49 
 
No. of obs.    24      24     24     24     44     47 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Adjusted R2 are from OLS. 
Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1% level. 
 
In section 1 we noted the possibility of cultural variation that is orthogonal to nationality, 
so we included the STBG self-report instrument in the post-experimental questionnaire to try and 
capture such variation, as mentioned in section 2. Tobit regressions of allocations on the 
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entitlement and the four STBG scales controlling for demographic variables are reported on 
Table A2 of the Appendix. They reveal no significant effects of any of the scales on the 
allocations of Spectators or Anonymous Stakeholders.14 As previously mentioned, however, such 
measures are notoriously unreliable, which is one reason our primary focus is on the treatment 
we designed that uses behavioural measures, to which we now turn.15 
TABLE 6 
MEAN RESULTS FOR GROUP AND KNOWN STAKEHOLDER 
   ALLOCATIONS BY COUNTRY 
 
                  Known 
   Group            Stakeholder  
                US   Japan     US   Japan  
Allocations 
    Mean   0.64    0.54    0.56    0.53  
    (Std. Err.) (0.036) (0.025) (0.021) (0.020) 
 
Entitlements 
    Mean   0.48    0.44    0.52    0.53  
    (Std. Err.) (0.007) (0.005) (0.023) (0.029) 
 
Difference mean allocation and mean entitlement 
    t-statistic   4.10     4.20    1.78    0.00  
    p-value <0.001   <0.001  0.081   0.998  
 
Difference mean allocation and equality 
    t-statistic   3.93     1.72    2.75    1.57  
    p-value <0.001    0.098   0.008   0.122  
 
No. of obs.    24      24     44     47  
 
Notes: The differences in means between allocations and entitlements employ paired t-tests. 
 
According to the HVIC Hypothesis in Figure 3, average Group allocations should exceed 
equality in Japan but not the US. The results of Table 6 reveal the opposite finding: mean 
allocations in the US significantly exceed one-half, whereas the difference is not significant at 
conventional levels in Japan. If we adjust the hypothesis to add an equal measure of self-interest, 
then Japanese allocations should still exceed US ones, but the reverse is actually the case 
                                                 
14 Additional regressions explore effects on the choice of equity versus equality by adding interaction 
terms of the scales with the entitlement (for the rationale, see the discussion of equation (2) in section 3.3 
below). These similarly reveal no effects of the scales that are significant at conventional levels, although 
introducing so many interaction terms produces multicollinearity that compromises the usefulness of such 
tests. 
15 In addition, validity is in question here with the self-reports: contrary to expectations, mean scores on 
all scales are significantly higher for US than Japanese subjects except for the one scale (VI) on which the 
score should be higher but is actually insignificantly lower (see Table A3 in the Appendix). 
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according to a two-tail t-test (t=2.27, p=0.027).16 Note also there is no self-interested bias in 
Known Stakeholder allocations: mean allocations do not exceed mean entitlements at 
conventional levels of significance. Returning to Table 5 for regression analysis of the Known 
Stakeholders, we see these individual dictators allocate, on average, amounts between equity and 
equality. This is consistent with the HVIC Hypothesis for Japan, which is posited to have a mix 
of HC and VC, but not with the proportionality of VI posited for the US. Overall, then, the 
evidence from Group and Known Stakeholders is mostly inconsistent with the HVIC Hypothesis. 
In addition to the cultural hypothesis for which it was primarily designed, the Group 
Stakeholder treatment is also related to studies in which subjects make both group and individual 
dictator allocations. For example, Cason and Mui (1997) find individuals might be slightly more 
selfish than groups (or “teams”), whereas Luhan, Kocher and Sutter (2009) report that groups are 
more selfish than individuals. Our results from Table 6 on mean Group and Known Stakeholder 
allocations are more consistent with the latter study, although the Group selfishness is only 
marginally significant for Japan. A Tobit regression of XA allocations on their entitlements and 
their previous Group X allocation to themselves show, in fact, that Group X selfishness only 
impacts individual selfishness in the US but not Japan (see Table A4 in the Appendix). 
3.3 Demographic Variables 
To examine whether allocations are related to demographic variables, we added the 
following regressors to equation (1): age, student expenditures during the school year, student 
earnings, parents’ annual income (in seven discrete categories), work hours per week, a gender 
dummy, and, for US subjects, dummy variables for Asian, black, Latino and Middle Eastern.17 
                                                 
16 One conjecture about the lower level of self-interest in Japan is that it is due to single-blind anonymity: 
Japanese subjects might be more inclined than US subjects to alter their decisions in order to present 
themselves more favorably to the experimenter. As mentioned previously, we did not see a way to 
conduct this experiment double blind, but any concern about this should, in any case, be allayed by a 
number of facts. First, the lead experimenter in the dictator room helped with registration, and whenever 
he recognized a subject, the subject was specifically assigned to a different room. Second, the lead 
Japanese experimenter was a graduate student who, in both countries, has lower social status than a 
professor, who was used in the US. Third, we know of no evidence that single blind procedures prompt 
any different response among Japanese subjects than among Western ones. For example, Okada and Riedl 
(1999) use the single blind method and find no significant difference, indeed, evidence elsewhere does 
not support any strong experimenter effect in general (e.g., Cason and Mui, 1997, and Bolton et al., 
1998). 
17 The questionnaire includes three variables that are not analyzed here, viz., college (e.g., Business, 
Liberal Arts) and major, since these are not comparable across institutions, as well as year in college due 
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We ran Tobit regressions separately for Spectator, Anonymous Stakeholder and Known 
Stakeholder decisions and for US and Japan resulting in six estimations, the results of which are 
reported in Table A5 of the Appendix. The entitlement continues to be positive and highly 
significant in every case, but almost nothing else is significant at conventional levels: age, 
parents’ income, work hours and race are never significant. One significant finding has a 
plausible explanation: student expenditures are insignificant, except in the Anonymous 
Stakeholder decisions, where expenditures are directly related to the fraction taken in the US and 
Japan. This seems reasonable: “big spenders” take more for themselves when they are able to so 
do (i.e., are stakeholders) and can do so with impunity due to anonymity. Three more 
coefficients that are significant at the 5% level have no obvious explanation, but, out of the total 
of 45 demographic coefficients, this number is roughly what is to be expected by chance. 
The Known Stakeholder decision offers the opportunity to explore whether dictators 
allocate differently based not just on their own race or gender but also on the race or gender of 
their recipients.18 We conducted two types of Tobit analyses, the results of which are presented 
on Table A6 in the Appendix. First, to examine possible in-group/out-group race biases, dummy 
variables are added to the right hand side of equation (1) for each such dictator/recipient pairing, 
e.g., Asian/Asian, Asian/non-Asian, etc. (whereby pairings that did not occur were dropped). The 
entitlement remains highly significant, but none of the race dummy variables is significant. 
Second, racial bias might be based not on the in-group/out-group distinction but rather on the 
race of the recipient, e.g., it could be that non-Asians as a group are less generous towards 
Asians. To test this, we add dummies to equation (1) for such dictator/recipient pairings as 
Asian/Asian, non-Asian/Asian, etc. (omitting pairings that did not occur). Again, the entitlement 
is highly significant, but none of the coefficients on the race dummies is significant. 
We can also examine whether knowing the gender of one’s recipient significantly 
impacts allocations in the Known Stakeholder decision. On average, men take 55% of the pie 
and women 54%, roughly equal shares. But both groups take somewhat more for themselves 
when matched with men (56% for both male and female dictators) than when matched with 
                                                                                                                                                             
to the high correlation with age. In a meta-analysis of dictator games, Engel (2011) reports that giving and 
age are significantly positively correlated, so we include it in our analysis for good measure, although an 
age effect here would be surprising given the age range in our dataset is much narrower than in Engel’s. 
18 Since the Japanese subjects were all Asian, the racially diverse pairings in the following analysis were 
entirely in the US sample. All of the following findings hold, though, for the pooled US/Japan sample. 
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women (53% for male dictators and 51% for female dictators). These are averages for the pooled 
sample, but we can analyse gender differences by nationality and controlling for entitlements.  
 
TABLE 7 
TOBIT REGRESSIONS FOR KNOWN STAKEHOLDER ON GENDER 
 
               NATIONALITY OF DICTATOR             
Indep. Var.             US            Japan      Pooled US/Japan  
Intercept               0.50*** 0.27*** 0.31*** 
    (0.10)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
 
Entitlement   0.37***  0.51*** 0.46*** 
    (0.12)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
 
Male with female –0.14*   0.01  –0.01 
    (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
 
Female with female –0.17** –0.03  –0.03 
    (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.03) 
 
Female with male –0.11  –0.05  –0.02 
    (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
 
Adjusted R2   0.24   0.49   0.33 
 
No. of obs.    44    47    91 
 
Notes: The omitted category is male dictator matched with male recipient. 
Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Table 7 reports the results of Tobit regressions of A subject (i.e., XA and YA) allocations on the 
entitlement and dummies for three dictator/recipient pairings: male/female, female/female and 
female/male, where male/male is the omitted category. The estimated intercept and entitlement 
slope coefficients and their significance are consistent with previous estimates of Known 
Stakeholder allocations, indicating as before a mixture of equality and equity. Interestingly, 
gender does not matter for Japanese dictators or in the pooled sample. American dictators of both 
genders, however, take less when paired with female counterparts, although this is only 
marginally significant for male dictators. In the US, women matched with women take 17 
percentage points less (relative to men matched with men). This pattern is consistent with the 
greater generosity of women toward women in Dufwenberg and Muren (2006) but is opposite 
the lesser female/female generosity in Ben-Ner, Kong and Putterman (2004). The absence of a 
gender effect in Japan might be related to the fact that Japanese Known Stakeholders, in contrast 
to their US counterparts, take, on average, no more than the entitlement leaving no room for 
them to be even fairer to women. 
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Interacting the entitlement with various demographic variables tends to render results 
insignificant given the resulting multicollinearity and reduced degrees of freedom. But where 
hypotheses or prior results suggest an effect on the equity-equality trade-off, we estimate OLS 
and Tobit versions of the following regression that include the “Variable” in question: 
 
 (2)  Allocationi = a + b·Entitlementi + c·Variablei + d·Entitlementi·Variablei + εi 
 
If, for example, equality is positively related to the Variable, the coefficient on c should be 
negative and the coefficient on d positive: as Variable increases, dictators increasingly depart 
from equality and approach proportionality. The few significant results are limited to the Known 
Stakeholder decision (see Table A7 of the Appendix). One out of the eight possible gender 
pairing/country combinations for this decision is significant: US male dictators equalise more 
when the recipient is female. Also, contrary to Almås et al. (2016), low socio-economic status 
subjects do not equalise more, in fact, Known Stakeholders equalise significantly less, perhaps 
related to our different measures of socio-economic status (we use parents’ income). 
3.4 Methodological Variables 
As previously discussed, one reason sometimes given for equality is that people forgo 
proportional accounting when the stakes are not very large, in particular, when decisions are not 
anonymous. The Known Stakeholder decision offers an opportunity to test this by estimating 
equation (2) using Stakes as the Variable.19 We focus on the Known Stakeholder results, since 
only this case fits the story involving non-anonymous decisions, and since it is the only decision 
in this experiment with sufficiently large variance in stakes to test meaningfully its effect.20 
The Tobit regression results are presented in Table 8 and confirm all predictions of the 
hypothesis: larger Stakes significantly decrease the intercept, with an estimated coefficient of –
0.252, and significantly increase the slope, with a parameter estimate on the interaction term of 
0.556. Thus, larger stakes are associated with significantly more proportional allocations, or, put 
                                                 
19 To ease interpretation, the Stakes variable was created as follows: the total points available to each X/Y 
or A/B pair, respectively, are divided by the average total points across all pairs in the Spectator, 
Anonymous Stakeholder and Known Stakeholder decisions. Thus, the average stakes across these 
decisions equal 1, while the allocation and entitlement continue to be measured as fractions of the 
individual stakes. 
20 The variance of standardized stakes in the Spectator and Anonymous Stakeholder decisions are both 
0.06, whereas it is more than four times greater at 0.27 in the Known Stakeholder decision, significantly 
larger than the former two. 
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differently, dictators allocate more equally with smaller stakes.21 Indeed, this regression provides 
the strongest evidence of equality: controlling for the size of stakes, allocations in this treatment 
do not differ significantly from an intercept of 0.5 and a slope coefficient of 0 on the Entitlement. 
 
TABLE 8 
TOBIT REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF EFFECT OF 
STAKES ON KNOWN STAKEHOLDER ALLOCATIONS 
 
Variable   Parameter estimate (Std. Err.)       
Intercept     0.511*** 
     (0.103) 
 
Entitlement    –0.023 
     (0.180) 
 
Stakes    –0.252** 
     (0.111) 
 
Entitlement × Stakes   0.556*** 
     (0.196) 
 
Adjusted R2      0.41 
 
Number of observations      91 
 
Notes: Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
 
An alternate explanation for this finding is that stakes are correlated with an omitted 
variable that causes more equal allocations. Specifically, suppose whether or not one was 
previously in a position of power affects subsequent equality preferences. That is, YA dictators 
might equalise more, on average, not because of the smaller stakes but because of sympathy or 
solidarity with YB dictators who were similarly powerless in the first round. We add a dummy 
variable for YA Known Stakeholders and an interaction term with the entitlement to equation (2) 
to test this conjecture. Results reported on Table A8 in the Appendix show these terms are not 
significant, but the estimates of the other variables in equation (2) are almost unchanged in 
magnitude and significance. Thus, it seems the size of stakes per se drives these results. 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
The results of this study strongly support the empirical relevance of two fairness rules, 
equity and equality. Specifically, test after test shows that, if the entitlement is known, dictator 
                                                 
21 The results remain qualitatively the same, if we run this regression using OLS or on the US and 
Japanese sub-samples: the estimates of a and d are significantly positive, c significantly negative and b 
insignificant. 
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allocations are significantly related to it, indicating the importance of equity. The relevance of 
equality varies from not at all to very much depending on structural variables that implicitly 
determine the relative weights on the two rules. But we believe the results of this experiment are 
interesting, not only for the importance of structural variables for this equity-equality trade-off, 
but also for the large number of non-structural variables that are not important. 
We stated and tested possible relationships of fairness rules to nationality and culture in 
three different ways. First, the hypothesis that fairness corresponds to equity in the US and to 
equality in Japan is refuted by evidence that both groups value both rules. In fact, subjects in 
both countries shift their weights on the rules in almost identical ways across the changing 
circumstances of the three individual decisions. Second, the richer STGB approach posits two 
cultural dimensions based on the importance of in-groups/out-groups and equality/inequality, but 
we find no significant effects of their four self-reported scales on allocation decisions. Third, the 
Group Stakeholder treatment was designed as a behavioural test of a version of the STGB 
framework applied to distributive justice by activating group identities, but most of the results 
contradict fundamental predictions of that framework. There are scattered cases of differences in 
the trade-off between self-interest and fairness, e.g., US stakeholders often act more on their self-
interest than Japanese ones. But we find no significant national or cultural differences in the 
essence of what people consider fair, specifically, in the equity-equality trade-off. 
In multi-variate regression analysis, demographic variables are rarely significant, while 
the entitlement is always directly and significantly related to allocations. One plausible effect 
here is that US and Japanese “big spenders” act more selfishly, when they have a stake in the 
allocation and are anonymous. But this is arguably as much a structural as demographic or 
cultural effect, especially since it is found in both the US and Japan. Known Stakeholder 
allocations do not depend on the race of the dictator or recipient, but we find isolated gender 
effects: when the recipient is female, female dictators take less, and male dictators equalise more, 
although in both cases only among US subjects. Out of the many possible effects of demographic 
variables we consider, few are significant, and for most of these few, it is difficult to mount a 
strong claim that they are more than statistical flukes. 
Finally, stakes can be treated as a methodological variable in some contexts, but here we 
consider stakes as a structural variable that might affect fairness preferences themselves. We 
find, first, that Spectators allocate according to equity and not equality in their positions as 
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impersonal third parties. On the other hand, stakeholders, both anonymous and known, act on a 
combination of equity and equality. Second, the equity-equality trade-off depends on the size of 
stakes in the Known Stakeholder decision. At zero stakes, these dictators equalise completely, 
but, as the stakes rise, they shift significantly toward proportional allocations, indicating an 
increasing weight placed on equity. 
In sum, we find effects on fairness preferences of structural variables, including 
entitlement, anonymity, stake-holding, and the size of stakes, which are robust across a wide 
range of non-structural variables that almost never matter, including nationality, culture, age, 
race, gender, and various measures of income and work. What might account for this pattern of 
effects and non-effects? We end by suggesting an answer to that question and by discussing 
some implications of our conclusions for economic theory and policy. 
Consider first the pattern of differences in the equity-equality trade-off across the three 
individual decisions. Impartial and impersonal Spectators exhibit a preference for equity but 
none for equality. Anonymous Stakeholders are otherwise the same and differ only in that they 
share earnings as one member of the two person group, i.e., their relationship in the decision is 
personal rather than impersonal. Known Stakeholders are similar to Anonymous Stakeholders 
except that they are known to and by and communicate with the other member of their group, 
making their relationship even more personal. In section 1.2, we introduced a term for the 
unifying characteristic that varies across these decisions: proximity signifies how personal the 
relationship is between parties. Proximity increases progressively from the Spectator to the 
Anonymous Stakeholder to the Known Stakeholder decisions as does the importance of equality 
in fairness preferences. Thus, a reasonable conclusion is that fairness corresponds to equity in 
impersonal relationships and combines equity and equality in personal ones, whereby the weight 
on equality increases with proximity. Finally, the results on stakes in the Known Stakeholder 
decision suggest that, when the relationship is personal, fairness preferences shift progressively 
from equal splits to a rule with increasing weight on equity as the size of stakes rises. 
This interpretation accounts for the main effects on fairness preferences through the 
operation of the structural variables, and their robustness suggests common fairness preferences. 
Almost without exception, the significant effects of non-structural variables on behaviour are not 
due to any effect on fairness rules but rather to the effect of such variables on the weight placed 
on self-interest versus fairness. We believe this interpretation can also reconcile other findings on 
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social preferences. For example, the difference between spectator equity and the stakeholder shift 
toward equality is also observed in Gächter and Riedl (2006) and Konow (2000). And many 
studies have found considerable individual heterogeneity in weights placed on self-interest 
versus fairness, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and on competing rules of fairness, e.g., 
Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen and Tungodden (2007) and Charness and Rabin (2002). Regarding 
national differences, a greater general tendency for Japanese to comply with moral rules relative 
to Americans could explain both our results and the fact that the former punish low contributions 
to public goods more vigorously, e.g., Cason, Saijo and Yamato (2002). Indeed, such differences 
in the relative salience of multiple moral rules or in the willingness to act on them might well 
explain a wide range of differences in international bargaining experiments, e.g., Henrich, et al. 
(2001) and Kocher et al. (2008). 
Thus, both the current study and previous ones can be seen as pointing toward common 
moral rules that relate strongly to structural variables, which determine the weight attached to the 
various rules and self-interest. If found to be robust, this conclusion has many implications for 
theory and policy. It augers well for efforts to construct stronger positive theories of social 
preferences. In addition, many philosophical schools (including but not limited to ethical 
naturalism) consider such empirical moral knowledge relevant to normative theory. Here the 
impartial judgments of our spectators offer possible raw materials for prescriptive theory, which, 
in turn, supplies a normative foundation for policy. Policy advice, however, also requires an 
understanding of the effects of moral rules in a world populated by stakeholders, whose motives 
are partially moral at best. And here the sustained importance of structural variables among our 
stakeholders is a favourable indication of information that can inform private and public policies. 
These findings might provide lessons for understanding behaviour and guiding policy in a 
variety of contexts, such as the following. The wage structure of firms might partly reflect a 
tension between management’s goals, perhaps more aligned with efficiency and equity, and a 
preference by labour for greater equality. The relative importance of equity versus equality could 
depend on how personal worker relations are and on the size of the stakes involved. Perhaps 
partners treat one another more equally than they would themselves be treated by judges and 
juries. A person might favour more equitable redistribution policies as a voter, whose negligible 
expected stake in the outcome reduces him almost to a spectator, but treat a friend, family 
member or co-worker more equally. Perceptions of equity and equality affect and are affected by 
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trade and international environmental treaties based on various factors (e.g., Lange et al., 2010). 
And the US-European differences in redistributive policies, which Alesina and Angeletos (2005) 
identify, can be seen as a difference about a matter of fact (viz., the actual importance of 
responsibility in determining allocations) rather than a fundamental difference in support for 
equity or equality. 
As Blanco, Engelmann and Normann (2011) point out, a fairness concept does not 
necessarily predict individual behaviour well across different decisions, even if it rationalises 
data well at the aggregate level. Thus, future research should examine the robustness of our 
findings on the equity-equality trade-off to the kinds of contexts listed above and to different 
types of decisions. Indeed, building on the results of the current study, Konow, Johannsen-
Stenman, Martinsson and Medhin (2016) design a natural field experiment, the main results of 
which indicate that being paid in accordance with different rules can alter the fairness 
preferences of workers, affecting the relative weights on equity and equality. 
Finally, the difference identified here between spectator equity and importance of 
equality among stakeholders could be a part of a more general distinction between two types of 
moral preferences: morals and mores. As we use the terms, morals refer to the moral preferences 
of an impartial or impersonal party, and we call their rules moral principles. In the context of this 
experiment, equity is a moral principle. Mores, by contrast, refer to the moral preferences that 
are distinct to personal relationships, and we call their rules moral norms. In our study, equality 
is a moral norm. This choice of terminology reflects our attempt to stay close to common usage 
(although, of course, these terms have often been used interchangeably in the social preferences 
literature). Whereas morals connote general and impartial views of right and wrong, mores are 
often defined as the “morally binding customs of a particular group,” which implies a certain 
specificity to social context and possible ephemerality. Thus, moral principles could be common 
and enduring, whereas moral norms vary according to the context and adjust over time. Future 
tests of this distinction might go beyond the current context of distributive justice and examine, 
for example, social dilemmas: although individuals likely share a common desire, ceteris 
paribus, for efficient outcomes, many personal factors affect actual cooperation norms, including 
communication, strategy set, order of play, and the history of cooperation. 
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Appendix 
Not for Publication 
 
Appendix A 
Additional Data Analysis 
 
Table A1 
TOBIT REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ALLOCATIONS 
INCLUDING DISTRIBUTIVE PREFERENCE QUESTIONS 
 
             Anonymous       Known 
            Spectator        Stakeholder     Stakeholder  
Intercept              –0.10    0.21   0.42*** 
    (0.189) (0.206) (0.110) 
 
Entitlement   0.96***   0.66***  0.45*** 
    (0.107) (0.132) (0.066) 
 
Task control  –0.03    0.06   0.01 
    (0.032) (0.038) (0.016) 
 
Basic needs  –0.01    0.01  –0.01 
    (0.025) (0.027) (0.014) 
 
Guaranteed income   0.05  –0.05  –0.03* 
    (0.039) (0.038) (0.018) 
 
Efficiency as equality   0.04  –0.01  –0.02 
    (0.041) (0.038) (0.023) 
 
Efficiency as equity   0.01  –0.01  –0.01 
    (0.033) (0.036) (0.021) 
 
Adjusted R2   0.68   0.34   0.36 
 
No. of obs.    48    48    90 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. N=90 for Known Stakeholder due to a 
missing response on the questionnaire. Adjusted R2 are from OLS. 
Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1% level. 
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Table A2 
TOBIT REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ALLOCATIONS 
ON STGB SCALES WITH CONTROLS 
 
             Anonymous 
            Spectator        Stakeholder     
Intercept              –0.43   –0.52   
    (0.443) (0.604)  
 
Entitlement   0.92***   0.67***  
    (0.135) (0.130)  
 
HI     0.00   –0.00   
    (0.003) (0.003)  
 
VI     0.00  –0.00   
    (0.002) (0.002)  
 
HC     0.00    0.00   
    (0.002) (0.004)  
 
VC   –0.00  –0.01   
    (0.003) (0.003)  
 
Controls included for age, income, expenditures, earnings, distributive 
  preferences, and dummies for gender, race and country 
 
Adjusted R2   0.67   0.41   
 
No. of obs.    47    48   
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Adjusted R2 are from OLS. 
Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1% level. 
 
 
TABLE A3 
MEAN SCORES ON CULTURE SCALES BY COUNTRY 
  
US Japan 
Test of Difference 
in Means 
(Ho:US=JP) 
No of 
Obs. 
Mean score 
No 
of 
Obs. 
Mean score t-statistic 
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (P-value, two tail) 
Horizontal 
Individualism (HI) 
216  
54.26  
216  
43.62  15.01  
(0.450) (0.548) (0.000) 
Vertical 
Individualism (VI) 
215  
43.92  
215  
44.27  -0.37  
(0.744) (0.587) (0.713) 
Horizontal 
Collectivism (HC) 
216  
58.16  
215  
48.81  11.52  
(0.522) (0.621) (0.000) 
Vertical 
Collectivism (VC) 
215  
44.67  
216  
38.50  7.15  
(0.648) (0.573) (0.000) 
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Table A4 
TOBIT REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF XA ON GROUP X ALLOCATIONS 
 
    Japan      US       
Intercept              0.31*** –0.10 
    (0.102) (0.407) 
 
Entitlement   0.44***   0.89*** 
    (0.078) (0.263) 
 
Group X allocation –0.06    0.31** 
    (0.165) (0.121) 
 
Adjusted R2   0.54   0.58  
 
No. of obs.    24    24  
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Adjusted R2 are from OLS. 
Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1% level. 
 
 
Table A5 
TOBIT REGRESSION ANALYSIS ON DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES 
Treatmt
No. of 
obs.
constant
entitleme
nt
age
dummy 
Female
(Male=0, 
Female=1
)
dummy 
Asian 
(Asian=1. 
others=0)
dummy 
African
(African=
1,others=
0)
dummy 
Hispanic
(Hispanic
=1, 
others=0)
dummy 
Middle 
East 
Asian 
(Middle 
East 
Asian=1, 
expenditu
res
(US 
$1000)
parents 
income
work 
hours 
week
earnings 
(US 
$1000)
Adjusted 
R2 OLS
LR 
chi2(1)
(P-value)
left-
censored 
Obs. 
(alloc<0)
right-
censored 
Obs. 
(alloc>1)
-0.403 1.052 -0.019 -0.031 -0.014 -0.057 0.180 -0.170 0.024 -0.003 0.001 -0.022 23.590
0.674 0.309 0.028 0.064 0.139 0.142 0.092 0.156 0.008 0.018 0.003 0.010 0.015
-0.600 3.400 -0.670 -0.490 -0.100 -0.400 1.960 -1.080 3.130 -0.150 0.520 -2.290
0.561 0.005 0.512 0.633 0.923 0.696 0.071 0.298 0.008 0.882 0.611 0.039
0.949 0.549 -0.039 -0.140 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 0.007 0.039 -0.008 0.018 27.660
0.446 0.147 0.022 0.077 0.002 0.028 0.007 0.023 0.000
2.130 3.730 -1.720 -1.830 2.670 1.410 -1.180 0.770
0.048 0.002 0.103 0.086 0.016 0.178 0.255 0.452
0.068 1.069 0.006 0.031 0.043 (dropped) 0.016 (dropped) -0.003 -0.019 0.006 -0.009 35.410
0.597 0.163 0.024 0.082 0.107 0.101 0.002 0.030 0.007 0.007 0.000
0.110 6.560 0.260 0.380 0.400 0.150 -1.410 -0.650 0.850 -1.240
0.910 0.000 0.800 0.710 0.694 0.880 0.178 0.524 0.408 0.233
-0.138 1.142 -0.006 0.105 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 0.003 0.040 -0.009 0.013 38.710
0.305 0.128 0.015 0.037 0.003 0.018 0.005 0.025 0.000
-0.450 8.930 -0.420 2.870 0.810 2.200 -1.920 0.530
0.657 0.000 0.677 0.011 0.431 0.043 0.073 0.605
-0.163 0.331 0.026 -0.028 0.025 -0.055 -0.034 (dropped) 0.000 0.014 0.003 -0.013 15.640
0.327 0.136 0.018 0.044 0.049 0.096 0.075 0.001 0.011 0.004 0.009 0.110
-0.500 2.440 1.430 -0.650 0.520 -0.580 -0.450 0.320 1.280 0.840 -1.500
0.621 0.020 0.163 0.520 0.608 0.569 0.654 0.750 0.211 0.405 0.143
0.102 0.514 0.007 -0.068 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.003 39.200
0.158 0.069 0.008 0.034 0.003 0.013 0.002 0.015 0.000
0.650 7.430 0.910 -1.990 0.950 -0.260 0.180 0.180
0.522 0.000 0.368 0.053 0.348 0.797 0.856 0.856
t-statistic
(P-value)
Anon. 
Stakeh. 
US
24
coefft est
(std error)
0.304 0
1
t-statistic
(P-value)
1
t-statistic
(P-value)
Anon. 
Stakeh. 
Japan
24
coefft est
(std error)
0.516 1 2
Spect. 
Japan
23
coefft est
(std error)
0.745 1
Spect. 
US
24
coefft est
(std error)
0.650 3
43
coefft est
(std error)
0.090 0
0
t-statistic
(P-value)
1
t-statistic
(P-value)
Known 
Stake. 
Japan
47
coefft est
(std error)
0.488 0 0
t-statistic
(P-value)
Known 
Stake. 
US
 
Notes: For significant results, p-values are colour-coded according to levels of significance. The numbers of 
observations are sometimes lower than in other analyses due to missing responses on the questionnaire. Where 
applicable, yen are converted to US$ with the same ratio used for show-up fees and points, viz., $1=150 yen. 
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Table A6 
TOBIT REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF RACE FOR KNOWN STAKEHOLDERS 
No. of 
obs.
Intercept Entitlemt
Asian to 
Asian
Asian to 
Non-
asian
Black to 
Black
Black to 
Non-
black
White to 
Non-
white
Latino to 
Latino
Latino to 
Non-
latino
adjusted 
R2
LR 
chi2(1)
(P-value)
left-cend. 
obs. 
(alloc<0)
right-
cens. obs. 
(alloc>1)
0.344 0.428 -0.022 0.008 (dropped) -0.047 0.012 (dropped) -0.042 11.670
0.072 0.127 0.094 0.054 0.079 0.054 0.064 0.070
4.750 3.380 -0.230 0.150 -0.590 0.220 -0.660
0.000 0.002 0.816 0.879 0.557 0.825 0.516
1
t-stat
(p-value)
44
Coeft est
(std err)
0.111 0
 
No. of 
obs.
Intercept Entitlemt
Asian to 
Asian
Non-
asian to 
Asian
Black to 
Black
Non-
black to 
Black
Non-
white to 
White
Latino to 
Latino
Non-
latino to 
Latino
adjusted 
R2
LR 
chi2(1)
(P-value)
left-cend. 
obs. 
(alloc<0)
right-
cens. obs. 
(alloc>1)
0.342 0.431 -0.022 0.030 (dropped) (dropped) -0.008 (dropped) -0.034 11.460
0.072 0.126 0.094 0.064 0.047 0.056 0.043
4.750 3.420 -0.230 0.470 -0.170 -0.610
0.000 0.001 0.815 0.641 0.865 0.547
44
Coeft est
(std err)
0.129 0 1
t-stat
(p-value)  
Notes: For significant results, p-values are colour-coded according to levels of significance. The omitted 
category in both regressions is White-white. Pairings that did not occur have been dropped. 
 
 
Table A7 
SIGNIFICANT TOBIT REGRESSION RESULTS FOR KNOWN STAKEHOLDERS 
WITH INTERACTIONS OF ENTITLEMENT WITH GENDER (TOP) AND PARENTS’ INCOME (BOTTOM) 
F-stat
(p-val)
No of 
Obs.
Intercpt Entitle MF MF*Ent FF FF*Ent FM FM*Ent Intercpt Entitle MF MF*Ent FF FF*Ent FM FM*Ent
c=d=e=f
=g=h=0
-0.247 1.590 0.748 -1.522 0.488 -1.036 0.439 -0.869 -0.690 2.750 2.050 -2.550 1.230 -1.540 1.180 -1.420 3.280
0.356 0.579 0.364 0.596 0.395 0.673 0.373 0.612 0.492 0.009 0.047 0.015 0.225 0.132 0.247 0.164 0.011
0.267 0.516 -0.077 0.176 -0.026 (dropped) 0.067 -0.205 5.430 5.860 -0.820 1.010 -0.280 (dropped) 0.650 -1.210 1.300
0.049 0.088 0.094 0.174 0.091 0.103 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.417 0.317 0.781 0.522 0.235 0.284
47
US
Japan
44
Parameter estimate
Null hypothesis 
t-statistic
(standard error) (P-value, two tail)
 
F-stat
(p-val)
No of 
Obs.
Intercpt Entitle
PI 
(Parents' 
Income)
Ent*PI Intercpt Entitle
PI 
(Parents' 
Income)
Ent*PI b=c=d=0
-0.18 1.35 0.09 -0.15 -0.760 2.810 2.310 -2.010 6.640
(0.24) (0.48) (0.04) (0.08) (0.45) 0.008 0.026 -0.051 0.001
-0.16 1.26 0.14 -0.25 -1.190 5.060 3.280 -3.220 23.150
(0.14) (0.25) (0.04) (0.08) (0.24) 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.000
Japan 47
Parameter estimate
Null hypothesis 
t-statistic
(standard error) (P-value, two tail)
US 44
 
Notes: Male-to-Male (MM) is the omitted category in the Gender regressions. For significant results, p-
values are colour-coded according to levels of significance. 
 
 
Table A8 
TOBIT REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF STAKES AND YA STATUS FOR KNOWN STAKEHOLDERS 
F-
(P-value)
No of Intercpt Entitle Stakes Ent*Stks YA YA*Ent Intercpt Entitle Stakes Ent*Stks YA YA*Ent e=0 and 
0.467 0.016 -0.255 0.581 0.109 -0.155 4.440 0.090 -2.280 2.970 1.550 -1.220 1.460
0.105 0.180 0.112 0.196 0.070 0.127 0.000 0.928 0.025 0.004 0.124 0.226 0.238
91 0.416
Parameter estimate Null hypothesis adjusted 
R2
t-statistic
(standard error) (P-value, two tail)
 
Notes: YA is a dummy variable equal to 1, when the dictator is the A subject in Room Y. For significant 
results, p-values are colour-coded according to levels of significance. 
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Appendix B 
Composite Experimental Instructions and General Questionnaire 
 
Versions of Instructions 
 
         Forms by Subject 
Treatment          Phase Allocation Decision  X Y Z 
 
Spectator   1     I (X) I (Y) 
    2  Spectator   III III  IV 
 
Anonymous Stakeholder 1     I (X) I (Y) 
    2 Anonymous Stakeholder II II 
 
Group Stakeholder  1     VII(X) VII(Y) 
    2 Group    V V 
    3 Known Stakeholder  VI VI 
 
Phase 1 Instructions 
Room (X)[Y] (Versions I and VII) 
 
No talking allowed 
We ask that you do not talk or communicate with one another in any way, unless the 
experimenter instructs you to do so. If you have any questions after we finish the instructions or 
at any time during the experiment, please raise your hand, and the experimenter will approach 
you and answer your question in private. 
 
Subjects 
You have been assigned a Subject ID, which appears on the top right of this sheet. This is used 
only to track your decisions. You will never know the Subject IDs of subjects in any other group, 
and they will never know yours. 
 
There are subjects in another room, who are also participating in this experiment. We will call 
this room Room (X)[Y] and the other room Room (Y)[X]. Subjects in Room X have Subject IDs 
that begin with the letter X, and subjects in Room Y have Subject IDs that begin with the letter 
Y. Subjects in both rooms read the same instructions throughout this experiment. 
 
Two phases of experiment 
There are two phases to this experiment. In Phase 1, every subject performs a task that involves 
preparing letters for mailing. For each letter correctly produced, 100 points are earned. Each 
point is worth [¥ 1.5/1 cent], so each correct letter is worth [¥ 150/1 dollar]. The subjects in 
the other room face the same task and also generate 100 points of earnings for each correct letter. 
Subjects in both rooms are working under the same conditions, with the same kind of materials 
and producing the same kind of letters. After this task is complete, the letters are counted, and 
the second phase begins. 
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In Phase 2 of the experiment, subjects in this room are matched with counterparts in another 
room to form groups. For each group, the points of the matched subjects are added up and 
credited to its group account. All of the points in every account will be distributed in cash to the 
group that shares that account. A given group member cannot be guaranteed any specific 
amount, however, since that will depend on the decisions of arbitrarily chosen persons. The 
details of these distributional procedures will be provided after Phase 1 is complete. 
 
Phase 1 task 
Now we will explain the details of the first phase. Each of you has in front of you a stack of 
twenty green sheets, twenty blue sheets and twenty envelopes and to the right of your seat a 
sealed box. My assistant will now demonstrate the tasks you are to complete. You are to fold the 
sheets in thirds and put one green and one blue sheet separately in each envelope. Then you close 
the envelope but do not seal it, and put it through one of the two slots at each end of the box. You 
may accomplish these tasks in any way you wish as long as the basic results are obtained. 
Everyone will have five {six} minutes to prepare the letters. The more letters you correctly 
prepare, the more points are credited to your group account. When I call “Time!” you must cease 
all activity: leave the remaining materials on your desk – any envelope not already in your box 
when time is called does not count. 
 
Phase 2 Instructions 
(Version II) 
 
Matching of subjects 
In a moment, we will tell you the results of the Phase 1 task. For the purposes of calculating 
points to group accounts, subjects will be matched as follows. In this session, each person in 
Room X is paired with one other person in Room Y to form an X/Y Pair consisting of two 
people. Each X/Y Pair is assigned an account; the points credited to this account equal the sum 
of the points earned by the X Subject and the Y Subject in the Phase 1 task. 
 
Allocation of earnings 
The subjects in Room X have been arbitrarily chosen to decide how the total points in their 
accounts will be distributed between the X Subject and the Y Subject. The form you are about to 
receive will indicate separately for the X Subject and the Y Subject how many letters each 
correctly prepared, the total number prepared by both subjects, and how many total points have 
been credited to their account. For subjects in Room X, the form will also include spaces for 
indicating how much, if any, of the total points each X Subject wishes to allocate to him- or 
herself and how much, if any, to his or her matched Y Subject. This decision is completely up to 
the X Subject and is confidential. The X Subject just needs to make sure that the total allocated 
to the two subjects equals the total available in their account. X Subjects will have five minutes 
to make their decision and to place the form in the envelope provided. These forms will then be 
collected, and the individual results of the task and the X Subject decisions sent to the paired Y 
Subjects along with their payments. We will distribute the results of the Phase 1 task as soon as 
they have been calculated. Please continue to sit and wait without talking until the results arrive. 
If you have any questions now or after you receive the form, raise your hand, and I will approach 
you to answer your question in private. 
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Phase 2 Instructions 
(Version III) 
 
Matching of subjects 
In a moment, we will tell you the results of the Phase 1 task. For the purposes of calculating 
points to group accounts, subjects will be matched as follows. In this session, each person in 
Room X is paired with one other person in Room Y to form an X/Y Pair consisting of two 
people. Each X/Y Pair is assigned an account; the points credited to this account equal the sum 
of the points earned by the X Subject and the Y Subject in the Phase 1 task. In addition, there are 
subjects in a third room, Room Z, each of whom is matched with one X/Y Pair. 
 
Allocation of earnings 
The subjects in Room Z have been arbitrarily chosen to decide how the total points in the X/Y 
accounts will be distributed between the X Subject and the Y Subject. The form they are about to 
receive will indicate separately for the X Subject and the Y Subject how many letters each 
correctly prepared, the total number prepared by both subjects, and how many total points have 
been credited to their account. The form will also include spaces for indicating how much, if any, 
of the total points each Z Subject wishes to allocate to his or her matched X Subject and how 
much, if any, to his or her matched Y Subject. This decision is completely up to the Z Subject 
and is confidential. The Z Subject just needs to make sure that the total allocated to the two 
subjects equals the total available in their group account. Z Subjects will have five minutes to 
make their decision and to place the form in the envelope provided. These forms will then be 
collected, and the individual results of the task and the Z Subject decisions sent to the X/Y Pairs 
along with their payments. We will distribute these results as soon as they are available. Please 
continue to sit and wait without talking until the results arrive. 
 
Instructions 
Room Z (Version IV) 
 
No talking allowed 
We ask that you do not talk or communicate with one another in any way. If you have any 
questions after we finish the instructions or at any time during the experiment, please raise your 
hand, and the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. 
 
Subjects 
You have been assigned a Subject ID, which appears on the top right of this sheet. This is used to 
track your decisions, but it is known only to you and the experimenter. You will never know the 
Subject ID of any other subject, and they will never know yours. 
 
There are subjects in two other rooms, who are also participating in this experiment. We will call 
this room Room Z and the other rooms Rooms X and Y. Subjects in all rooms have Subject IDs 
that begin with the letter of their room, hence, subjects in this room have Subject IDs that begin 
with Z. 
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Two phases of experiment 
There are two phases to this experiment. In Phase 1, every subject in Rooms X and Y performs a 
task that involves preparing letters for mailing. For each letter correctly produced, 100 points are 
earned. Each point is worth [¥ 1.5/1 cent], so each correct letter is worth [¥ 150/1 dollar]. 
Subjects in both rooms are working under the same conditions, with the same kind of materials 
and producing the same kind of letters. They also read the same instructions throughout the 
experiment. After this task is complete, the letters are counted, and the second phase begins. In 
Phase 2 of the experiment, X and Y subjects are matched together in groups of two. The points 
of the matched subjects are added up and credited to their group accounts. The people in this 
room, the Z Subjects, have been arbitrarily chosen to decide the allocation of these earnings 
between X and Y Subjects. 
 
Phase 1 task 
Now we will explain the details of the first phase. Each of the subjects in Rooms X and Y has in 
front of them a stack of twenty green sheets, twenty blue sheets and twenty envelopes and to the 
right of their seat a sealed box. My assistant will now demonstrate the tasks they are to complete. 
They are to fold the sheets in thirds and put one green and one blue sheet separately in each 
envelope. Then they close the envelope but do not seal it, and put it through one of the two slots 
at each end of the box. They may accomplish these tasks in any way they wish as long as the 
basic results are obtained. Everyone will have five minutes to prepare the letters. The more 
letters they correctly prepare, the more points are credited to their group account. 
 
Phase 2 Decision 
In Phase 2 of the experiment, each person in Room X is paired with one other person in Room Y 
to form an X/Y Pair consisting of two people. Similarly, every person in this room, Room Z, is 
matched with an X/Y Pair. Each X/Y Pair is assigned an account; the points credited to this 
account equal the sum of the points earned by the X Subject and the Y Subject in the Phase 1 
task. All of the points in every account will be distributed in cash to the matched subjects who 
share that account. The subjects in this room, Room Z, have been chosen to allocate these 
earnings between their matched X Subject and Y Subject. For this task all Z Subjects will 
themselves receive a separate ¥1500/$10 payment, which has nothing to do with the payments to 
their X/Y Pairs. This is in addition to the ¥750/$5 on-time fee all subjects were already paid at 
the start. 
 
In a moment the results of the task will be made available to you. The exact same information 
will also be made available to your X/Y Pair. The form you are about to receive will indicate 
separately for the X Subject and the Y Subject how many letters each correctly prepared, the 
total number prepared by both subjects, and how many total points have been credited to their 
account. The form will also include spaces for indicating how much, if any, of the total points 
you wish to allocate to your matched X Subject and how much, if any, to your matched Y 
Subject. This decision is completely up to you and is confidential. You just need to make sure 
that the total allocated to the two subjects equals the total available in their group account. You 
will have five minutes to make your decision and to place the form in the envelope provided. 
These forms will then be collected. After all Z Subjects have been paid and have departed, the 
individual results of the task and the Z Subject decisions will be sent to the X/Y Pairs along with 
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their payments. If you have any questions now or after you receive the form, raise your hand, and 
I will approach you to answer your question in private. 
 
Phase 2 Instructions 
(Version V) 
 
Matching of subjects 
In a moment, we will tell you the results of the Phase 1 task. For the purposes of calculating 
points to group accounts, subjects will be matched as follows. In this session, each person in 
Room X is paired with one other person in Room X to form an X Group. Similarly, each person 
in Room Y is paired with one other person in Room Y to form a Y Group. Each X Group in 
Room X is also matched with one Y Group in Room Y to form an X/Y Group consisting of four 
people: two X Subjects in an X Group plus two Y Subjects in a Y Group. Each X/Y Group is 
assigned an account; the points credited to this account equal the sum of the points earned by the 
X Group and the Y Group in the Phase 1 task. 
 
Allocation of earnings 
The subjects in Room X have been arbitrarily chosen to decide how the total points in their 
accounts will be distributed between the X Group and the Y Group. The form you are about to 
receive will indicate how many letters the X Group and the Y Group combined correctly 
prepared, and how many total points have been credited to their X/Y Group account. For subjects 
in Room X, the form will also include spaces for indicating how much, if any, of the total points 
each X Group wishes to allocate to itself and how much, if any, to its matched Y Group. This 
decision is completely up to the X Group and is confidential. The X Group just needs to make 
sure that the total allocated to the two groups equals the total available in their X/Y Group 
account. X Groups will have five minutes to make their decision and to place the form in the 
envelope provided. During this phase of the experiment, the two subjects in each X Group may, 
of course, speak quietly with one another. They are not, however, to speak with other X Groups 
or to speak loudly enough to be heard by other groups. Each X Group will then put its decision in 
the envelope provided. If at the end of the five minutes, the two subjects in an X Group cannot 
agree on an allocation, one member of the group will be randomly chosen to make the allocation. 
These forms will then be collected, and the results sent to the matched Y Groups. At that point, 
the two subjects in each Y Group may speak quietly with one another. They are not, however, to 
speak with other Y Groups or to speak loudly enough to be hear by other groups. We will 
distribute the results as soon as they have been calculated. At that time, some subjects will be 
asked to stand up and change seats in order to sit next to the subject in their group. Please 
continue to sit and wait without talking until the results arrive. If you have any questions now or 
after you receive the form, raise your hand, and I will approach you to answer your question in 
private. 
 
Further Phase 2 Instructions 
(Version VI) 
 
No talking allowed 
Once again, we ask that you do not talk or communicate with one another in any way. You will 
have an opportunity to ask questions after we finish reviewing the instructions. 
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Final decision 
The final decision of Phase 2 also concerns the distribution of earnings. Each X Group has now 
chosen an amount of the total points to allocate to itself and an amount to allocate to its matched 
Y Group. The current decision is how to allocate those amounts to the two subjects within each 
separate group in Room X and Room Y. This decision will be made independently for every 
group in Rooms X and Y. For each group, one person, called Subject A, will be arbitrarily 
chosen to decide how the points in their group account will be distributed between 
himself/herself, Subject A, and the other subject, called Subject B, in their group. 
 
Each Subject A is about to receive a form that indicates, for his/her group, how many letters 
Subject A and Subject B each correctly prepared, the total number prepared by both subjects, and 
how many total points have been credited to their account according to the previous decision by 
the X Group. The form will also include spaces for indicating how much, if any, of the total 
available points Subject A wishes to allocate to himself/herself and how much, if any, to A’s 
paired Subject B. This decision is completely up to Subject A. Subject A just needs to make sure 
that the total allocated to the two subjects equals the total available in their group account. 
Subject A will have five minutes to make this decision and to place the form in the envelope 
provided. These forms will then be collected. After all A Subjects have been paid and have 
departed, the individual results of the task and the A Subject decisions will be sent to the paired 
B Subjects along with their payments. 
 
Please continue to sit and wait without talking until the results arrive. If you have any questions 
now or after you receive the form, raise your hand, and I will approach you to answer your 
question in private. 
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Appendix C 
Post-experimental Questionnaire 
General Questionnaire 
Please answer these questions about yourself, indicating just one answer per question. 
 
1. What is your college? 
1 Business           3 Liberal Arts 
2 Communications and Fine Arts        4 Science and Engineering 
 
2. What is your first major (if undeclared, write UD)? 
_______________________________ 
 
3. What year in college are you? 
1 Freshman          3 Junior 
2 Sophomore          4 Senior 
            5 Graduate 
 
4. What is your age? 
________ years 
 
5. What is your gender? 
1 Male           2 Female 
 
6. What is your ethnicity (if several apply, please choose the one that you consider most 
accurate)? 
1 Asian/Pacific-Islander        4 Latino/Hispanic 
2 Black/African-American        5 Middle-Eastern 
3 Caucasian          6 Native-American/American Indian 
 
7. What is your best estimate of your total expenditures this school year (September through 
May)? Please consider all expenses including tuition, housing, food, clothing, transportation, 
entertainment, etc., even if some are covered by financial aid or grants. 
$______________ for the current school year (September through May) 
 
8. What was the total (gross) income last year of your parents or guardians? Exclude your own 
earnings. Please choose a single response, even if it is a guess. 
1 $0 to less than $25,000         5 $100,000 to less than $125,000 
2 $25,000 to less than $50,000         6 $125,000 to less than $150,000 
3 $50,000 to less than $75,000         7 $150,000 or more 
4 $75,000 to less than $100,000 
 
9. How many hours per week do you usually work (Enter 0 if none)? 
________ hours per week 
 
 12 
10. Approximately how much money have you earned total through your work over the past year 
(the past twelve months)? 
$ __________ 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the statements below on the four-point 
scale provided. 
 
11. Consider the task in this experiment, and indicate your agreement or disagreement with 
this statement: 
The performance of subjects on the task in this experiment was due mostly to things that they 
could control, like their effort or their decisions, as opposed to things they cannot control, like 
innate ability. 
  1   2   3   4 
  Strongly agree        Agree       Disagree  Strongly disagree 
 
12. The basic needs of people for food, clothing and shelter differ greatly across individuals. 
  1   2   3   4 
  Strongly agree        Agree       Disagree  Strongly disagree 
 
13. There should be the same income guarantee for all people. 
  1   2   3   4 
  Strongly agree        Agree       Disagree  Strongly disagree 
 
14. The way for companies to be most productive and efficient is by minimizing differences 
in pay across workers. 
  1   2   3   4 
  Strongly agree        Agree       Disagree  Strongly disagree 
 
15. The way for companies to be most productive and efficient is by paying workers 
according to their productivity. 
  1   2   3   4 
  Strongly agree        Agree       Disagree  Strongly disagree 
 
 
Consider now the questions below. Respond on the nine-point scale provided, the key to which is 
repeated at the top of each of the following pages. 
Please indicate your sense of the event’s frequency or your degree of agreement with 
each statement below. Use the following scale where 1 means never or definitely no and 9 means 
always or definitely yes: 
        Never              Always 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
    Definitely no        Definitely yes 
 
1. I often do “my own thing.” 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
2. One should live one’s life independently of others. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
3. I like my privacy. 
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  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
4. I prefer to be direct and forthright when discussing with people. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
        Never              Always 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
    Definitely no        Definitely yes 
 
5. I am a unique individual. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
6. What happens to me is my own doing. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
7. When I succeed, it is usually because of my abilities. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
8. I enjoy being unique and different from others in many ways. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
9. It annoys me when other people perform better than I do. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
10. Competition is the law of nature. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
11. When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
12. Without competition, it is not possible to have a good society. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
13. Winning is everything. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
14. It is important that I do my job better than others. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
15. I enjoy working in situations involving competition with others. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
16. Some people emphasize winning; I’m not one of them. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
(Note: this question is reverse scored.) 
 
17. The well-being of my co-workers is important to me. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 14 
 
18. If a co-worker gets a prize, I would feel proud. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
        Never              Always 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
    Definitely no        Definitely yes 
 
19. If a relative were in financial difficulty, I would help within my means. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
20. It is important to maintain harmony within my group. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
21. I like sharing little things with my neighbors. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
22. I feel good when I cooperate with others. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
23. My happiness depends very much on the happiness of those around me. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
24. To me, pleasure is spending time with others. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
25. I would sacrifice an activity that I enjoy very much if my family did not approve of it. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
26. I would do what would please my family, even if I detested that activity. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
27. Before taking a major trip, I consult with most members of my family and many friends. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
28. I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
29. Children should be taught to place duty before pleasure. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
30. I hate to disagree with others in my group. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
31. We should keep our aging parents with us at home. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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32. Children should feel honored if their parents receive a distinguished award. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
